



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
OF CUSTODIAL SERVICES

JUNE 2015

REPORT OF AN ANNOUNCED INSPECTION OF
BUNBURY REGIONAL PRISON

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Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison

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June 2015

ISSN 1445-3134 (Print)
ISSN 2204-4140 (Electronic)

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Contents

THE INSPECTOR'S OVERVIEW

BUNBURY REGIONAL PRISON: PERFORMING WELL AND A PRISON WITH FURTHER POTENTIAL.....	iii
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FACT PAGE	vi
-----------------	----

CHAPTER 1

A DUAL FACILITY PRISON	1
The Prison's Roles and Facilities.....	1
Inspection Methodology and Themes.....	3

CHAPTER 2

MANAGING A COMPLEX PRISON (STAFF, MANAGEMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE).....	5
Departmental Management	5
Local Leadership	6
Staffing and Staff Culture	8
Prison Infrastructure Needs.....	16

CHAPTER 3

PROVIDING A SAFE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT	19
Background	19
Security Staffing and Infrastructure.....	20
Relational and Cultural Security	23
Procedural Security	24

CHAPTER 4

WELLBEING AND HEALTH	27
Living Conditions.....	27
Health and Mental Health	32
Mental Health and Emotional Wellbeing	35

CHAPTER 5

SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY ISSUES FOR ABORIGINAL AND OTHER PRISONERS	38
Policy Frameworks	38
An Under-used Capacity to Support Aboriginal Prisoners?	38
Resocialisation for Life and Indefinite Sentence Prisoners.....	41
Support for Mentally Impaired Prisoners.....	42

CHAPTER 6

SUPPORTING REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION	43
Sentence Planning and Case Management.....	43
Supporting Legal Needs Including Parole Applications	44
Programs.....	45
Education, Training and Industries.....	47

CHAPTER 7

THE PRE-RELEASE UNIT	54
Management of the PRU.....	55
PRU Custodial Staffing.....	57
Aligning the PRU Population with the Re-entry Role	58
Pre-release Services.....	58
Preparing for Release and Reintegration.....	62

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS: BUNBURY 2014 – SOLID FOUNDATIONS AT BUNBURY’S DUAL FACILITIES....	63
Accommodation Infrastructure.....	63
Security	64
Substantive Equality	64
Aboriginal Prisoners	64
Long Sentence and Indefinite Sentence Prisoners.....	64
Management and Staff.....	64
Health.....	65
IT Literacy.....	65
Recreation	65
The PRU, Reintegration and Offender Management	65

APPENDIX 1

THE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS	67
---	----

APPENDIX 2

SCORECARD ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE 2011 RECOMMENDATIONS	77
---	----

APPENDIX 3

THE INSPECTION TEAM.....	80
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APPENDIX 4

KEY DATES	81
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The Inspector's Overview

BUNBURY REGIONAL PRISON: PERFORMING WELL AND A PRISON WITH FURTHER POTENTIAL

TWO PRISONS, NOT ONE

Bunbury Regional Prison ('Bunbury') comprises two distinct facilities. They are jointly administered but perform different roles and on a day-to-day basis, function largely independently.

The older section ('the main prison') generally holds around 230 prisoners. It is predominantly a medium-security prison but also has a number of maximum-security cells, mainly to accommodate short term remand prisoners. Immediately adjacent to the main prison and the gatehouse, is 'Unit 5'. This is a minimum-security unit comprising 37 single cells. In 2009/2010, the Department of Corrective Services ('the Department') invested resources to upgrade Unit 5, but it only operated for six months after the upgrades, and has been unused for the past five years.

Standing quite separately from the main prison is the Pre-Release Unit ('PRU'). This opened in late 2008. It is a self-contained facility, surrounded by its own fence, and houses minimum-security prisoners who meet its selection criteria. With a design capacity of 72, it is very similar in size and concept to the Boronia Pre-release Centre for Women in Perth. Prisoners live in shared houses and must demonstrate personal responsibility and collaboration, catering for themselves, looking after their houses, and undertaking education or employment. The facility has its own entrance, reception, visits area, health centre, education centre and gym. Trustworthy prisoners who satisfy additional risk assessments are able to work outside the PRU itself. Some work in the large market gardens, some undertake supervised community work, and a handful undertake job-seeking activities or employment.

GENERAL FINDINGS

Bunbury has faced some major challenges over the past twelve years. It has moved from a small prison with 120 prisoners that faced a real threat of closure to a 300 prisoner facility that is performing well, plays a critical role in the total prison system, and should have a vibrant future. A good deal has improved since 2011 and it is a well-performing prison.

Local management and staff working in all areas are providing a generally safe, therapeutic and productive environment. The prison enjoys positive staff/prisoner relations, and this contributes to both security and safety. There are good services across most areas, including the provision of health services and offender programs. The industries and garden areas are highly productive and provide a reasonable level of employment-relevant training.

Although Bunbury is performing well, this report has identified a number of areas for improvement with respect to prison conditions and services. One of these is staff morale / culture. Unfortunately, while staff should be positive about the prison and take pride in what they have achieved, they appeared conflicted and negative. Addressing these issues is a shared responsibility, one for staff themselves as well as for local and head office management.

‘LIFERS’ WHO ARE ‘STUCK’

I am very concerned at legislative gaps in the availability of ‘Re-Socialisation Programs’ (‘RSPs’) for life sentence and indeterminate sentence prisoners. The RSP allows prisoners whom the Prisoners Review Board and the Attorney General consider suitable, on advice from the Department, to be placed in minimum-security prisons. They are subject to a detailed individualised program which, if completed successfully, may lead to them being granted parole.

There is no guarantee that a person on an RSP will be released: its purpose is to provide a controlled ‘testing ground’ for assessing prisoners’ attitudes, an opportunity for adjustment to a higher degree of freedom, and an incentive to good behaviour. For prisoners who have been in prison for a long time, it makes perfect sense to ‘stage’ their release in this way, rather than releasing them directly to parole from higher security prisons. However, 20 per cent of prisoners serving ‘life’ or ‘indefinite’ sentences in the state are not eligible for inclusion in an RSP on the technical ground that they were sentenced under a 1963 Act of Parliament and not a 2003 Act.ⁱ Almost half of these men are at Bunbury. They are generally the prisoners who have been longest in the system and who are in most need of structured re-socialisation programs.

The current situation makes no sense in terms of either public safety or equity of treatment for prisoners. It gives the Prisoners Review Board only two choices. It may release such prisoners without them undertaking an RSP, which it has done on occasion. Alternatively, they can leave them in higher security prisons, even though prisoners whom pose similar risks, and who have been sentenced more recently, are eligible for an RSP.

The issue was raised in our 2011 report on Bunbury. We were informed in late 2011 that amendments were to be drafted and in November 2014, the Attorney General advised Parliament that amendments are under consideration. I fully understand the need to ensure community safety, but properly run RSPs do exactly that. The issue has drifted for too long.

MANAGING THE PRU AND EVALUATING ITS OUTCOMES

Until mid-2014, the PRU was required to hold 108 prisoners, meaning that half its rooms were ‘doubled up’. During this time, some of its prisoners were not truly ‘pre-release’ but had more than 12 months still to serve. In other words, the PRU was operating as a long term minimum-security prison as well as a re-entry facility. Although it bedded in well, and developed many areas of excellent practice, the pressure of numbers and its prisoner mix compromised its ability to operate as a true pre-release facility.

I have consistently argued that the PRU should be allowed to concentrate on what it was designed to do, namely to provide targeted services to prepare people for release and reduce the risk that they will return to prison. This is not a case of being ‘soft on prisoners’ but an intelligent social and economic investment. In 2013–2014, across the system, it cost the state an average of \$334 per day, or almost \$122,000 a year to keep one person in prison.

i See the annual reports of the Prisoners Review Board for 2012–2013 and 2013–2014, and [5.21]–[5.25] of this report.

And the indirect and social costs of crime and incarceration are even greater. I therefore welcome the Department's decision in April 2014 to reduce PRU numbers to 72 true 'pre-release' prisoners. More generally, I strongly support the Department's focus on protecting the community by reducing recidivism contained in its 2015–2018 Strategic Plan.

However, I am not persuaded that the current management arrangements for the PRU will allow it to meet its full potential. In terms of its capacity and re-entry focus, it is similar in size to Boronia Pre-release Centre for Women and Wandoo Reintegration Facility for young men. There are also similarities with Pardelup Prison Farm. Boronia, Wandoo and Pardelup are all prisons in their own right, not adjuncts to other prisons. They all have their own budgets, performance requirements, management teams and staff. Wandoo, as it is privately operated, is subject to some particularly strong performance measures.

The PRU does have a Manager but it operates essentially as an adjunct to the main prison. This report recommends that it should be set up as a stand-alone facility; that in terms of head office management, it should be aligned with other minimum-security prisons; and that for as long as it remains an adjunct of the main prison, it should have a dedicated roster of staff. The Department has rejected all of these recommendations. I was not surprised by this but I was disappointed: I strongly believe the PRU will function better with a higher degree of financial and management autonomy and strong performance measures.

Outcomes are, however, more important than structures. I look forward to assessing in the future whether the PRU has cemented and developed its role. I also look forward to seeing evaluations of the performance of the PRU in comparison with Wandoo, Boronia, Pardelup and the main prison.

LOOKING AHEAD

Bunbury is operating well and has a solid track record as one of the more settled and better performing prisons in the state. As the state's population increases in the southern metropolitan corridor and in Bunbury, Rockingham, Mandurah and other south west towns, Bunbury offers an obvious site for potential expansion. I believe it is well-equipped to take on such a challenge and to provide high quality correctional services, and that it should be factored into DCS strategic asset planning for future expansion. That is one reason that I previously recommended the PRU as an option for female prisoners.

In the short term, consideration needs to be given to the potential uses of Unit 5. It is a good, albeit small, facility and it needs to be used. The potential options include conversion to use as a facility for aged or infirm prisoners, a cohort that will increase in number and which presents some very specific needs.

Neil Morgan

8 June 2015

Fact Page

NAME OF FACILITY

Bunbury Regional Prison ('Bunbury') is located in Noongar land.

ROLE OF FACILITY

Bunbury is a multifunctional prison. Its key roles include prisoner rehabilitation through treatment programs, education, training and employment, and re-entry services. The prison is also a key producer with the market garden supplying over 40 per cent of West Australian prison needs; and the metal shop and veggie preparation workshops all earning revenue through external contracts.

The prison holds medium- and minimum-security male prisoners and remandees, as well as some maximum rated remandees on a short-term basis.

The prison consists of a medium-security facility, and a minimum-security Pre-Release Unit (PRU). Both have their own infrastructure, including education centres, medical centres, workshops, canteen/supermarkets, gyms, libraries, and administration offices.

The prison also has a minimum-security unit (Unit 5) at the front of the main facility. This unit was not being used at the time of the inspection.

LOCATION

The prison is 11km south of Bunbury; and 183km south of Perth. It is located next to Manea Park, a conservation reserve that supports listed species such as western ringtail possums and black cockatoos.

PREVIOUS INSPECTION

The last inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison was held on 24–29 July 2011.

DESCRIPTION AND CAPACITIES OF ACCOMMODATION UNITSⁱⁱ

Unit	Description
1	Maximum-security unit consisting of 14 double-bunked cells, of which six cells are kept for men remanded by the police; four punishment cells and two medical observation cells. The total number of beds for this unit is 20.
2	Standard medium-security accommodation, the oldest part of the prison – 68 partially double-bunked cells with a total of 96 beds.
3	Ten self-care 'cottages' designed to hold prisoners in 70 single cells, but increased through partial double-bunking to a total capacity of 110 beds.
4	The PRU, designed for 72 prisoners. The unit has 36 additional beds, allowing for a total of 109 beds.
5	A minimum-security unit with 37 single occupancy cells. This unit is currently not operational.

ii Figures provided by DCS as of 19 May 2015.

BUNBURY REGIONAL PRISON POPULATION CAPACITY

Design Capacityⁱⁱⁱ	261	Main facility Design Capacity^{iv}	152	PRU Design Capacity	72
Total Capacity^v	384 ^{vi}	Main facility total number of beds^{vii}	238	PRU total number of beds	109
Operational Capacity^{viii}	304	Main facility Operational Capacity	232	PRU Operational Capacity	72

The Department defines its own 'total' capacity based on the overall number of beds in a facility. This includes those originally designed for use, those added (usually as bunked beds), and any special purpose, and decommissioned or temporarily unused beds.

The operational capacity gives the maximum number of prisoners that can actually be held (rather than the number of beds).

NUMBER OF PRISONERS HELD AT TIME OF THE INSPECTION^{ix}

Total number of prisoners	297	Aboriginal prisoners	61	Remandees	34
Maximum-security prisoners	6	Medium-security prisoners	189	Minimum-security prisoners	102

At the time of the inspection Bunbury was holding slightly less men than the maximum allowed under its operational capacity.

iii For Bunbury, the overall design capacity includes single occupancy use of all cells in Units 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, excluding management and medical-use cells.
iv Based on single occupancy use of all cells in Units 1, 2 and 3, and excluding management and medical-use cells.
v For Bunbury, this includes all beds in Units 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
vi Total capacity of 384 taken from the Department’s website for Bunbury Regional Prison.
vii Based on the use of all beds in Units 1, 2 and 3. Note that Units 4 and 5 are outside the main facility.
viii Department of Corrective Services, Inspection Documentation.
ix Population numbers taken from the Department’s Total Offender Management System on 7 November 2014.

Chapter 1

A DUAL FACILITY PRISON

- 1.1 This chapter provides a context for examining the operation of Bunbury Regional Prison ('Bunbury'). It provides an outline of the prison population, accommodation, and roles, as well as a summary of the inspection methodology.
- 1.2 This was the fifth inspection of Bunbury. The previous four inspections occurred in December 2002, December 2005, August 2008 and July 2011. The on-site component of this inspection commenced on 2 November and concluded on 7 November 2014.
- 1.3 This inspection was also the second inspection of the Pre-Release Unit (PRU) of the prison, which opened in November 2008. As such, it presented the first opportunity to measure the progress of the PRU since its baseline inspection in July 2011.

THE PRISON'S ROLES AND FACILITIES

- 1.4 Bunbury is a male adult facility. It is a multifunctional prison that delivers rehabilitative services for minimum- and medium-security prisoners, while functioning as a major producer of vegetables, cabinet shop and metal products for the prison system. It also houses a small number of remandees, some of whom are rated maximum-security, on a short-term basis.
- 1.5 Bunbury's operations extend across two sites. The main facility primarily focuses on rehabilitation for medium-security prisoners. The minimum-security PRU focuses on prisoners' preparation for release and reintegration into the community.

Prisoner Accommodation

- 1.6 The main facility consists of two medium-security units and a maximum-security short-term holding unit. The medium-security prisoners were accommodated in Unit 2 (C Block) and Unit 3 (self-care). C Block accommodated 96 prisoners in 68 standard cells while Unit 3 housed 110 prisoners in 70 cells, throughout 10 self-care cottages. Maximum-security prisoners were accommodated for short stays in Unit 1, which had capacity for 26 prisoners. Six Unit 1 cells were kept available to accommodate people arrested by the police and a further six cells (also in Unit 1) were reserved for punishment or medical observation purposes. These 12 specific purpose cells were not included in the operational capacity of 304.



Photo 1 : A double-bunked cell in Unit 3 – the self-care unit.

- 1.7 Two additional minimum-security units sit external to the main facility. The PRU (also known as Unit 4) is a separate minimum-security facility, co-located but situated outside the main facility's perimeter fence. The facility has its own infrastructure including administration buildings, workshop, and canteen/supermarket, but shares the prison's management team. Some services, including education and health, were also shared between Bunbury and the PRU, although run from separate facilities. The PRU had returned to its design capacity of 72 at the time of the inspection, after having operated with a capacity of 108 for most of the period since the previous inspection in 2011.
- 1.8 The original minimum-security unit (Unit 5) had a capacity of 37. Unit 5 was closed when the PRU opened in November 2008. Resources were dedicated to gutting, repainting and refitting the unit and it reopened from May to November 2010. It reportedly ran well as a residential base for minimum-security prisoners engaged in the external activities under section 95 of the Prisons Act.¹ Prior to the inspection the Department had stated its intention to examine the possibility of making Unit 5 'a dedicated facility to house prisoners on the Prisoner Employment Program' – a program which allows for paid work in the community – and section 95 community activities.²

Addressing the Crowding Problems

- 1.9 During the previous inspection the Inspector noted Bunbury was crowded and lacked sufficient staff, services and facilities for the number of prisoners it housed.³ In 2013/14, the prison's medium-security facility remained crowded. The main facility had a design capacity of 150, but had held between 219 and 228 since the last inspection.⁴ This had resulted in significant double-bunking of single cells, adversely affecting the prison's hierarchical management of prisoners. To address this the prison had recently started to create more single cells in the self-care unit (Unit 3) by increasing the number of shared cells in the standard accommodation unit (Unit 2).
- 1.10 From April 2014 the PRU had been reduced from a capacity of 108 to 72, matching its original design capacity and re-entry role. While there was room for further improvement in re-entry resources, the number of education, training, and transitional management staff were now better matched to the number and type of prisoners held at the PRU. This represented a significant improvement on the situation from 2008 to March 2014, when pre-release services had been impacted by high numbers and by the fact the PRU was housing some long term minimum-security prisoners who had more than 12 months still to serve, and were therefore not in the 'pre-release' phase of their sentence.

1 Minimum-security prisoners can apply for external work under section 95 of the *Prisons Act 1981*. Section 95 external work provides an important element of the reintegration supported by the PRU, enabling prisoners to constructively engage in the local community, and gain valuable employment and training experience.

2 DCS, *2014 Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison, Department of Corrective Services Submission*, October 2014.

3 'Crowding' refers to inadequacy of staffing, services and facilities in proportion to the number of prisoners held at a facility. Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services (OICS), Inspector's Overview, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Casuarina Prison*, Report No. 88 (March 2012) vii.

4 Data derived from TOMS, 24 March 2014.

- 1.11 This Office has been advised that the Department plans to cease holding minimum-security prisoners at Bunbury for treatment programs, thereby helping to ensure that the cohort of prisoners held will be better suited for pre-release activities, including those held in the community. This may also lessen the population pressure on the main facility which had been holding minimum-security prisoners waiting to be transferred to the PRU.

A Mixed Prisoner Profile

- 1.12 Bunbury has traditionally had a major focus on providing treatment programs for sex offenders. At the time of the 2011 inspection, the prison was holding more violent offenders than previously, and to alleviate the need to transfer violent offenders to other prisons, was offering both high and medium intensity violent offender programs. However, the prison's view at that time was that mixing high intensity violent offenders and sex offenders was unworkable. The prison had continued, since 2011, to hold a high proportion of violent offenders. For example, on 12 August 2014 38 per cent of prisoners were violent offenders, while only 28 per cent were sex offenders.⁵

INSPECTION METHODOLOGY AND THEMES

- 1.13 Between the 2011 and the current inspections, regular liaison visits were conducted in order to monitor performance and progress. Pre-inspection surveys of Bunbury's staff and prisoners were conducted in October 2014, providing an indication of issues of note prior to the commencement of on-site activities. 100 staff survey responses were received (from an FTE of 143 or nearly 70%), and 100 prisoner surveys were completed (from a total prisoner population of 301 on the survey date or around 33%). Targeted liaison visits in the lead-up to the on-site inspection also informed the inspection process.
- 1.14 Prior to the inspection, the Department was requested to provide relevant documentation and information. In preparing their response the Department conducted a review which examined progress against previous inspection recommendations and suggestions. This review provided more detailed and better targeted information than is usually the case for our inspections and, where appropriate, has been referred to in this report. A formal briefing was also provided by Bunbury's management team prior to the inspection.
- 1.15 During the on-site inspection, team members worked in pairs in order to enhance information collection and accountability. Follow-up documentation was provided by the Department during and after the inspection.
- 1.16 Reporting also involved the use of a housekeeping index which was provided to the Department prior to publication. This index provided information on issues that were minor and could be progressed by the prison or Department, as well as information that would compromise security or confidentiality if published. No information that needed to be on the public record was withheld.

5 DCS, TOMS, 12 August 2014.

Themes

1.17 The following themes for the inspection were developed in consultation with the prison, and as a result of a critical examination of the prison's progress since the last inspection in July 2011.

Drug trafficking and substance abuse

1.18 The inspection examined the particular difficulties faced by Bunbury, including perimeter security, when managing drug trafficking and substance misuse.

Reintegration and re-entry support

1.19 The inspection examined the PRU, and the prison's attempts to maximise employment and training opportunities and to match these with post-release employment and training pathways.

Programs

1.20 The inspection examined the adequacy of programs offered at Bunbury against the needs of the prisoners. The inspection also examined the placement of Bunbury as a 'programs prison' within the system as a whole.

Hierarchical management of prisoners

1.21 The inspection examined any obstacles the prison faced to good hierarchical management of prisoners, and in the strategies developed during 2014 to improve hierarchical management.

Infrastructure

1.22 The inspection examined how the prison and the Department addressed infrastructure challenges including Unit 1, the perimeter fence, and providing Skype.

Chapter 2

MANAGING A COMPLEX PRISON (STAFF, MANAGEMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE)

- 2.1 Bunbury Regional Prison (Bunbury) is a dual and multifunctional prison that delivers key reintegration, rehabilitative and productive objectives. It provides education, training, employment services for medium and minimum-security prisoners, re-entry services for minimum-security prisoners, and treatment programs for medium-security prisoners.⁶ It is also a key producer of vegetables and metal products for the prison system.
- 2.2 This chapter examines Departmental and local management of the prison. It reflects on Departmental guidance, oversight, and support; local management strengths and challenges; staffing, staff culture and overtime and leave management; and prison resourcing.

DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT

- 2.3 Departmental managers regarded Bunbury as a well-performing prison, competently delivering prisoner safety, as well as rehabilitation programs, while producing vegetables and metal products for the prison system. This broadly positive situation had a downside: in the wider context of: severe overcrowding in the women's estate and male metropolitan prisons, the January 2013 riot at Banksia Hill Detention Centre, and changes in the Department's management structure in 2013/14; Departmental and prison management stated that Bunbury had been a lesser priority than other, more problematic prisons.
- 2.4 Symptomatic of this lack of attention was a lack of consultation with Bunbury prison management by head office. For example, Departmental managers had not contacted the prison in regards to the possibility of using the Pre-Release Unit (PRU) to hold the overflow of women from the overcrowded Bandyup Women's Prison, despite seriously considering this possibility in 2014.
- 2.5 In the lead-up to the inspection, however, there had been an improvement in communication and consultation, with the Department including Bunbury and other regional prisons in monthly Superintendents' meetings from August 2014.⁷
- 2.6 This inspection found that insufficient head office strategic management may have contributed to some uncertainty and imbalance among the provision of Bunbury's key roles of reintegration, rehabilitation, and productivity (see chapters six and seven). Although the Department had refocused its management of re-entry services by placing minimum-security prisons, industries, and work camps under the guidance of a new Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services, Bunbury's PRU did not fall within his remit. Instead, the whole prison remained under the Assistant Commissioner Custodial Operations. There is a strong argument for enhanced support to be provided by Departmental management for the reintegration work of the prison and PRU (see Chapters 6 and 7).

6 The prison was providing programs for minimum security prisoners, but planned to finish doing so by early 2015. See [1.11].

7 The Superintendents' meetings originally only included metropolitan prison managers, with some use of remote conferencing.

- 2.7 Prison staff reported very low levels of satisfaction with Departmental management. Only 11 per cent of staff survey respondents reported satisfaction in the pre-inspection staff survey and several officers nominated Departmental management issues as one of the three most stressful things about working at Bunbury. These survey results corresponded to our findings during the on-site inspection.
- 2.8 There was also a general view among staff that constant policy changes in response to bad-press events such as escapes were unfortunate and gave rise to inconsistencies. For example, even those minimum-security prisoners who had unrestrained movement for external activities in the community, were being shackled and subject to a two-officer escort while on medical escorts or attending funerals (see Chapter 3).⁸ Some staff also complained that the prison was understaffed, and that the Department cared more for prisoner than staff welfare.

LOCAL LEADERSHIP

- 2.9 Bunbury is a complex prison to run, primarily because of its dual facilities and multiple roles. These roles included: providing rehabilitation programs for medium and minimum-security prisoners while supporting the reintegration of minimum-security prisoners, maintaining high levels of output from its market gardens, cabinet shop, vegetable preparation and metal workshops while managing a potentially volatile mixture of sex offenders and violent offenders, and providing hierarchical management in facilities unsuited to the size and mix of the prisoner population.
- 2.10 The prison had a strong senior management team which included the following permanently filled positions: Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent Operations (ASO), Assistant Superintendent PRU Manager, Security Manager and Business Manager. The Superintendent was relatively new in the position and was not from Bunbury itself. This had presented some challenges for Bunbury staff, as her style and expectations were not necessarily the same as the prison was used to. There was also evidence that at times the support provided to her from above had been equivocal at best when she started in the role. The prison also had a capable supporting management team, and held regular meetings of managers from across the different areas of the prison.
- 2.11 The inspection found there had been some demonstrated, positive progress in the local management of the dual facilities and services. The reduction in PRU prisoner numbers and the limitation of its prisoners to those eligible for re-entry services, as well as the return of the main facility to purely providing programs for medium (not minimum) security prisoners were sensible adjustments to better match facilities, roles and prisoner cohorts. The redeployment of senior administration staff to progress the hierarchical review demonstrated initiative in the context of resource limitations (as the prison would not have been able to gain additional funding for a project officer). The consultative approach to the hierarchical review – including the involvement of the prisoners' council, an Aboriginal prisoners' group, and custodial staff – was also commendable.

8 *Department's Assistant Commissioner Custodial Operations Notice 17/2014.*

- 2.12 Despite these strengths and achievements, there were some resource and strategic weaknesses in the Department and prison's management structure. These led to local management over-stretch, and subsequently exacerbated local communication and relational problems.
- 2.13 For most of the period since the 2011 inspection, the prison had lacked a substantive ASO on-site. Bunbury also had no Assistant Superintendent Offender Services (ASOS) position, unlike other prisons of comparable or lesser size and complexity such as Karnet and Wooroloo prison farms, and Greenough Regional Prison. At the time of the inspection there were signs of possible improvement; the substantive ASO had returned from secondment, and the Department's own pre-inspection review had suggested that the provision of an ASOS 'would be beneficial to the overall management of Bunbury Regional Prison'.⁹
- 2.14 Bunbury also lacked an industries manager, despite the prison's emphasis on productive industries, and the need to further develop provision of prisoner work and training relevant for post-release employment. While the Business Manager and Acting Business Manager had provided sound financial management, appointing an industries manager could assist with a more innovative and balanced management of the prison's reintegration and reparation roles.
- 2.15 Bunbury's dual facilities and the different roles and prisoner cohorts of each of these contributed to local management over-stretch. Although the provision of an ASOS would help alleviate this, there was a strong argument for independent management and resourcing of the PRU (as noted in Chapter 7 and Recommendation 16). This would bring this re-entry facility in line with the management structures for comparable facilities such as Pardelup Prison Farm, and Boronia Pre-Release Centre for Women, both of which have their own Superintendent and management team, and dedicated resourcing.
- 2.16 As discussed below, Bunbury's custodial and Vocational Support Officer (VSO) staffing groups expressed concern at low morale, festering conflicts, and the presence of an influential minority who did not seem to embrace the Department's required values of respect and support for prisoners. This had placed a large amount of work on the management team in tackling resistance to cultural change and managing inter-staff grievances and mediations. Understaffing in the management team limited the time available to engage with staff which made managing staff conflicts even more challenging.
- 2.17 These factors had contributed to some custodial staff perceiving a diminished sense of support from prison management. This was reflected in both the staff survey and the consultations held during the inspection. A significant number of custodial officers who responded to the survey identified local management issues as one of the three most stressful things about working at Bunbury; and while 44 per cent of all surveyed staff indicated that support from local management was 'mixed', only 21 per cent thought it was 'good'.

9 DCS, *2014 Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison, Department of Corrective Services Submission*, review team Recommendation 2, October 2014.

- 2.18 In addition, custodial staff nominated understaffing as one of the three most stressful things about working at Bunbury, with a number holding local administration responsible for the perceived problem. However, linking concerns about understaffing with concerns about local management suggests that some staff were holding local management responsible for issues that are outside their control, including the need for prisons to stay within budget despite high prisoner numbers.
- 2.19 As noted above, Bunbury's management team were understaffed and overburdened (particularly with the responsibility for managing two facilities). Arguably, the provision of an ASOS for Bunbury would free up the prison's senior management, and enable more time for the management of staff issues. However, this seems unlikely to eventuate, at least in the short term: in response to the draft report, the Department has said that the 2014 Staffing Agreement for Bunbury 'has been endorsed without the ASOS position being funded based on a muster of 304' and the population at Bunbury has been sitting just under 300.

STAFFING AND STAFF CULTURE

Staffing Levels, Redeployments

- 2.20 Bunbury lacked sufficient relief positions to cover purchased leave, personal leave, long service leave, internal secondments, workers compensation, some vacancies like the Senior Officer security positions, and the absence of staff redeployed for hospital sits. At the time of the inspection Bunbury reportedly needed 20 additional staff to cover all of its custodial and non-custodial staffing requirements. The prison was able to make use of a limited number of unfunded positions, but these were not sufficient to cover all of its shortfalls.¹⁰
- 2.21 The Court Security and Custodial Services contract limits the contractor's provision of staffing for hospital sits for the whole of regional West Australia to a maximum of two per day.¹¹ This restricted service contract had become subject to a parliamentary review at the time of writing.¹² Bunbury staff were doing many of the hospital sits and medical escorts for prisoners requiring external treatment; negatively impacting on the prison's staffing and shifts. For example, Bunbury conducted 22 hospital sits and 30 medical escorts from July through November 2014 at a total overtime cost of \$13,291 (approximately \$256 per hospital sit or escort). In the same period, Serco performed a total of 146 medical escorts (including emergency escorts) and 15 hospital sits.

10 Unfunded positions are those that have become redundant or been created through exceptional circumstances. At Bunbury there were some unfunded position caused by the closure of Unit 5. The prison kept the unit staff when the unit closed, but the positions no longer existed. The prison also had at least one unfunded officer position created through compassionate transfer. The officer worked at Bunbury, but there was no funded position for this officer. These unfunded positions were paid for by the prison going over budget. In 2011 there were 28 unfunded staff; this had dropped to six by the time of the 2014 inspection.

11 Government of Western Australia, *Contract for the Provision of Court Security and Custodial Services*, Attachment 2 to Schedule 4 – Baseline Volume Band, June 2011, 171.

12 The Legislative Council Western Australia, Report 22, Standing Committee on Public Administration, *Inquiry into the Transport of Persons in Custody*, Terms of Reference, 26 November 2014.

- 2.22 To cover its shortfalls, the prison typically had six to seven custodial officers working on overtime per day, and redeployed two to three staff per week from roles defined as ‘non-essential’. Despite these measures, custodial staff were concerned that staffing levels were sometimes unsafe. The example they used was the PRU. At night, the PRU should have a Senior Officer and two rovers but on one occasion had been reduced to having only one custodial staff member on duty. This occurred when two rostered PRU staff were required to work in the main facility instead. Staff also stated this had occurred when the PRU rovers were sent on external escorts and not replaced. In such instances the PRU Senior Officer manned the PRU control room, and was not able to leave this position.
- 2.23 Having only one custodial staff member on duty at the PRU is a staff to prisoner ratio of 1:72 at best, which must be considered inadequate for a prison facility, even if it houses minimum-security prisoners. This level of staffing created risks to staff and prisoners. For example, staff should not unlock a prisoner’s accommodation space alone (whether this be a house, cell or unit), so if a prisoner fell ill at night assistance could not be provided until another staff member was sourced from the main facility.
- 2.24 The ‘non-essential’ positions subject to redeployment typically included: the prison employment officer, the contracts support officer, orientation staff, the second recreation officer, the second market gardens officers, the second library officer, and the second education duty officer. The redeployment of the contracts support officer sometimes meant that the maintenance officer was taken away from his maintenance duties to oversee contractors such as plumbers and electricians.
- 2.25 A further issue was that no leave relief was provided for VSOs. A position particularly affected by this was the Prison Employment Officer, who had a large workload often requiring one-on-one support for prisoners. When custodial staff were available to ‘cover’ VSO positions they could only supervise the prisoners, rather than providing the training, mentoring, and administration performed by the VSOs, so their help was of limited value. The administration team also struggled to get well-trained staff relief, especially in the level I and II cashier, rosters clerk, visitors booking and switchboard positions. Like the VSOs, the administration team were overstretched because they lacked coverage for leave.

Recommendation 1

Ensure adequate relief coverage for all staff teams.

- 2.26 Some of the clerical and VSO staff had been on rolling short-term contracts (for example, three month contracts) for extended periods of time. Such short-term contracts hamper staff’s ability to achieve stability and make future plans in their personal and professional lives. It also affects the ability of the prison to attract and retain good, experienced staff. If staff are needed on a long term basis they should not be on short-term rolling contracts.

Aboriginal Staffing

2.27 Ideally, Aboriginal staffing numbers should reflect the high proportion of prisoners who identify as Aboriginal to provide adequate levels of support and cultural security.¹³ Aboriginal men comprised approximately 20 per cent of the Bunbury prisoner population at the time of the inspection but Aboriginal staffing levels were much lower than this. Only the Prison Support Officer, the administration clerk, the Aboriginal Visitor Service visitor and one of the chaplains were Aboriginal people. There were no Aboriginal custodial staff. There was also no Aboriginal health worker despite a recommendation to employ one from our last inspection.¹⁴ Education also lacked an Aboriginal tutor, though there were plans to advertise for one.

Staff Culture and Morale

2.28 The staff culture at Bunbury was a curious mix. There were many positives: the prison's gender balance was generally good, staff were mostly professional in their demeanour and interactions, and staff-prisoner relations were very good. There was also a common view that staff of each gender 'had each other's' backs,' in terms of both security and welfare. Furthermore, few staff were looking to transfer or leave. On the other hand, morale appeared low and the inspection revealed considerable negativity with respect to staff/staff and staff/management relations.

2.29 The Department's strategic plan includes a focus on safety, rehabilitation, reintegration and reduction in offending.¹⁵ However, few of the staff surveyed viewed being a partner in prisoner rehabilitation as a key staff role. The inspection team also encountered officers who believed that prisoners were being given too much and who failed to recognise the roles of rehabilitation, reintegration support and positive incentives for prisoners in reducing recidivism.

2.30 The Department requires its staff to support diversity and the particular needs of different groups, including Aboriginal people in particular. Despite the strong guidance of prison managers, and the expertise of the prison's Prison Support Officer and the Aboriginal chaplain, there were a small but very vocal number of staff at Bunbury who voiced the opinion that local management was too focused on supporting Aboriginal prisoners (see also Chapter 5).

2.31 The Superintendent was aware of the need to improve the custodial culture and was taking a consultative approach so that custodial staff could own the required cultural change. In future the prison may benefit from building upon the consultative approach being taken in the prison's hierarchical management review, by commissioning an external review. One of the benefits of such a review would be the impartiality that the reviewer would bring.

13 See [3.20]–[3.22] and [5.12]. Aboriginal staffing reviews in South Australia and New Zealand have recommended that representation should be sufficient to constitute a 'critical mass' of Aboriginal staff. See Barnett K, Spoehr J, & Parnis E, *Equity works: Achieving the target of 2% Aboriginal employment in the South Australian public sector, No. 1 Dunstan Paper* (2008); State Services Commission (NZ), *EEO progress in the Public Sector 2003 report with a special focus on Maori* (June 2003).

14 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) Recommendation 14.

15 DCS, *Creating Value through Performance, Strategic Plan 2015-2018*.

Recommendation 2

At all prisons and throughout the Department, implement processes to embed the values and goals of the new Strategic Plan, including its focus on respect, reintegration and substantive equality.

- 2.32 The Department's strategic plan requires the embedding of a culture of leadership and team work at all levels.¹⁶ This is particularly important at the Senior Officer level, as this group guides the unit officers in the day to day management of prisoners. There has been too little stability at this custodial middle management level, with too many Senior Officers acting up with insufficient leadership experience or training. Throughout 2014, the number of the Senior Office group acting up varied between one in six and three in six officers, with more than half of the officers acting up for over 200 hours during the year.¹⁷ This Office was provided with many examples of inconsistencies in the running of individual units. This was probably partly because the Senior Officers did not meet together on a regular basis to discuss management issues. While some Senior Officers appeared to guide their unit staff on the basis of Departmental values and strategies, others reportedly preferred a more punitive approach to prisoners. As part of its reform program, and to improve operational alignment with its values and strategic priorities, the Department needs to ensure that it invests sufficiently in its Senior Officers.

Recommendation 3

The Department should provide regular Senior Officer leadership and management training at all prisons.

Recommendation 4

Bunbury Prison should implement Senior Officer team meetings.

- 2.33 The pre-inspection survey indicated that Bunbury staff felt the quality of their life at the prison was lower than it had been at the time of the last inspection, and slightly lower than the state average of the last three years. Some staff demonstrated good morale, however, in meetings with custodial and VSO officers many staff stated that morale at the prison was low. The perceived causes included poor support from head office management, concerns over unsafe levels of understaffing, and some conflicts between individuals or groups of staff.
- 2.34 While the prison enjoyed good relational security (see Chapter 3), there was a view that the Department cared more for prisoner welfare and cost-cutting than for officers' safety and wellbeing. Understaffing was frequently cited during the inspection as one of the most stressful things about work at Bunbury. Delays in progressing work on the officers' unit offices, and the poor quality of items like the custodial office chairs were also cited as a reflection on the under-valuing of staff concerns.

16 DCS, *Creating Value through Performance, Strategic Plan 2015-2018*.

17 DCS, *Hours Acting as Senior Officer*, 2014.

- 2.35 Complaints about staff-on-staff bullying, and perceptions that prison management were insufficiently supportive and were failing to resolve staff conflicts and grievances in a timely and sensitive fashion, were also cited by staff as contributing to low morale. There were frequent complaints to the inspection team that a small minority of staff was spoiling the work environment for others, and that some abusive staff had continued their abuses of other staff. Some individuals claimed that they were required to work alone with others who they had reported as previously bullying them, or that they had not been adequately supported before being required to work in units with prisoners who had previously assaulted them. There were also some claims that requests for support from prison management had been met dismissively.
- 2.36 The Office probed these concerns with Bunbury management. They were able to provide documented evidence and timelines that in fact many of the matters raised by staff in relation to bullying had been addressed, or were being addressed, within the requirements of Departmental policies. They made the valid point that, for reasons of confidentiality, there are limits to what they could say about how specific issues involving individual staff were being addressed or what the outcomes had been.
- 2.37 Every workplace faces challenges in managing complaints and grievances, but Bunbury did face a significant problem, at least of perception: in the minds of many staff, issues were not being resolved. This report makes no recommendation in this regard but repeats the Inspector's comments in his exit debrief at the end of the inspection:

It is not for us to resolve these issues but it is disappointing that they are detracting from the positives at Bunbury. Addressing workplace issues is everyone's responsibility and not just a management responsibility.

Requirements of confidentiality limit what can be said by management (local or head office) by way of 'feedback'/'information', and due process requirements can affect timely resolution. However, Bunbury does need to ensure that matters are in fact dealt with, and to develop mechanisms to ensure that staff are confident that this is the case. More generally, the prison needs to examine ways to improve communication between staff and management and between staff themselves.

Staff Training and Support

- 2.38 A new Satellite Trainer commenced at Bunbury 18 months prior to the inspection. The trainer has provided good rates of compliance-necessary training including use of force (89%); fencing control (83%); batons (90%), and restraints (88%).
- 2.39 Given that 21 per cent of the prison population was Aboriginal at the time of the inspection, there was a strong need for training in cultural awareness, and the Prison Support Office was making good progress in this regard. The prison achieved good attendance rates for the Gatekeeper course (suicide prevention), although the reception officers – who engage prisoners when they first come into the prison and may be highly stressed – were not scheduled to receive Gatekeeper training until March 2015.

- 2.40 Staff training in non-compliance areas such as Mental Health First Aid and managing prisoners with drug issues was poor. The weekly training time was sometimes disrupted for staff redeployment or prison events, hampering non-compliance training in particular. Non-compliance training was also restricted by lack of funding for non-local training. Despite the limitations, the Satellite Trainer increased some non-compliance training in 2014, including Breathing Apparatus, use of chemical agents, and CPR/First Aid.
- 2.41 The ability of the prison to send staff to the Academy in Perth was restricted by funding, as absences would have to be covered by other staff on overtime. Departmental funding constraints also limited staff development training as Bunbury staff were generally not funded to attend training at the Academy in Perth; only 12 staff attended courses at the Academy in the first half of 2014. Staff also reported a reluctance to apply for Academy Training in Perth, because they believed their application was unlikely to succeed. The provision of Academy training at Bunbury was also limited. Although the Satellite Trainer is an Academy staff member, he was generally only able to provide compliance training rather than the wider range of courses, and developmental courses in particular, provided at the Academy.
- 2.42 At the time of the last inspection, Bunbury's prison-based staff support officers were receiving training and some one-on-one mentoring from the head office support officer.¹⁸ At the time of this inspection Bunbury had 17 staff support representatives and the Department stated that the staff support system was running well. While individual officers reported that they found the staff support system helpful, there were concerns among some staff that one or more of the support officers were individuals whom staff would not approach for support.

Overtime, and Workers Compensation Costs and Management

- 2.43 At the time of the last inspection this Office found that the increasing West Australian prisoner population had increased the staffing requirements and reliance on officers on overtime in Bunbury and other West Australian prisons.¹⁹ Staff overtime continued to be an ongoing issue. In 2013/14, the actual cost of overtime exceeded the amount budgeted for overtime by 15.5 per cent.
- 2.44 The Superintendent reported that the overtime budget only allowed for coverage of staff on sick leave and did not account for other forms of leave that needed staff replacement including hospital sits, training, workers compensation, and excessive sick leave. The overtime costs were incurred, in part, through the Superintendent's refusal to lock down accommodation units and industries. This refusal is understandable as it supports constructive activity for prisoners and contributes to a positive and safe prison. However, it also points to the difficult choices faced by prison Superintendents trying to maintain prisoner activities in the face of budget constraints.

18 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) 11.

19 *Ibid.*, 7.

- 2.45 Much of the overtime overspend consisted of staff covering other staff on personal leave and workers compensation leave. Bunbury had the fourth highest rate of workers compensation leave among the state's prisons in 2012–2014.
- 2.46 The two main areas for compensation claims were for sprains, and for stress. The former indicates possible areas of Occupational Safety and Health (OS&H) concern, as described below. The latter possibly indicated problems in terms of staff morale, as discussed earlier. Counsellors and staff demonstrated genuine concerns in this regard.
- 2.47 Bunbury held weekly workers compensation meetings in which the number and type of workers compensation cases were recorded and management plans developed. The Superintendent and Business Managers had attended an injury management course, to improve their management of staff on workers compensation, and had started implementing the lessons learned at the time of the inspection.
- 2.48 At Bunbury, as at many other facilities, however, there was a view that head office managed the paperwork but not the issues.²⁰ This led to a widespread perception of a culture of unwarranted workers compensation claims.²¹ The recent review of public service workers compensation regimes could potentially offer some improvements in management frameworks in future.²²

Occupational Safety and Health

- 2.49 Bunbury did not have an Occupational Safety and Health (OS&H) officer position. The Academy's Satellite Trainer was acting as an OS&H Coordinator under the guidance of the Business Manager, while performing his training role. Elected staff Safety and Health Representatives were responsible for reporting and managing OS&H issues, and were given a limited number of work hours to dedicate to the role. The Representatives reported, however, that they were working additional unpaid hours in order to progress the OS&H reports. The Business Manager estimated that the reporting and coordinating duties required the equivalent of an additional 0.5 FTE position.
- 2.50 Only 55 per cent of prison officer survey respondents felt they had received adequate OS&H training. OS&H manual handling training and chemical alerts was limited. Part of the reason for this was the low priority accorded to training, and to overcome staff unavailability for training due to redeployment, OS&H training would need to become compulsory. Generic OS&H training provided to prisoners by VSOs in industries was delivered as a component of certificates, traineeships, or as an induction to workshops in the relevant trade. There was scope for more specifically trade-relevant OS&H training to be provided in future. Such training would enhance workshop safety and better prepare prisoners for post-release employment.

20 OICS, *Directed Review into an Incident at Banksia Hill Detention Centre on 20 January 2013*, Report No.85 (July 2013) 85–86.

21 DCS, *2014 Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison, Department of Corrective Services Submission*, October 2014.

22 WorkCover W.A. *Review of the Worker's Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981*, 26 June 2014.

- 2.51 Bunbury had increased compliance with workers' safety requirements via industry risk assessments, hazard reporting, and quarterly meetings for OS&H representatives from throughout the prison. A new OS&H induction for contractors was a good initiative which included notification of on-site asbestos risks. The vaccination training policy had been improved. The Department provided online OS&H information for staff.
- 2.52 Despite these developments, OS&H had been negatively affected by budget restrictions, particularly where it involved capital spending, maintenance, or building works. OS&H improvement notices requiring the prison to take action had been necessary to obtain funding for 'big ticket' items. For example, an OS&H audit in 2014 provided sufficient leverage to get the kitchen ceiling fixed and funded.²³ WorkSafe audited the prison shortly before our inspection in October 2014, and issued 11 improvement notices. The prison had progressed most of these at the time of writing, and were working on three remaining notices.²⁴ Some of the OS&H risks identified had been longstanding. For example, a problem with the gatehouse doors had been ongoing for two years.
- 2.53 Prison records indicate that OS&H-relevant injuries were occurring more frequently than at the time of the last inspection. These injuries included sprains, strains, bruising and contusions, open wounds and cuts, and superficial injuries. Examples were provided to the inspection where the accidents were caused by not fixing identified problems and resulted in staff being unable to work for extended periods. These problems clearly contributed to the prison's excessive workers compensation burden.

Recommendation 5

Provide dedicated staffing to support OS&H management at Bunbury.

Prison Resourcing

- 2.54 Bunbury's spending was 6.2 per cent over budget in 2013/14.²⁵ Nearly all of this overspend was incurred through salary and wage costs. Bunbury was under-budget for non-salary expenditure. This was partly the result of good financial management and communication between business and industry managers, including the production of monthly business plans and industries meetings. Purchasing management was cost-effective.
- 2.55 Industries made a strong contribution towards self-sustainability, with income covering nearly two-thirds of the costs for industry supplies in 2013/14. In 2014 the market garden continued to be very productive, supplying 42 per cent of the whole prison estate's needs. The metal shop, cabinet shop, veggie preparation and vocational skills workshops all made strong contributions through external contracts.

23 Food Stars audit conducted by Laister Consulting Services on 14 March 2014.

24 By the time a response was provided to this report (19 May 2014) the prison stated that all improvement notices had been addressed.

25 DCS, Inspection Documentation 2014. Bunbury's 2013/14 budget was \$19,808,748; actual spending was \$21,039,867.

- 2.56 Good production levels were supported by Departmental investment in industries and gardens at Bunbury. The market gardens had a new VSO officer, tractor, chill packing room, and irrigation. They had re-established the tunnel house, and had fruit trees, and hydroponics.

PRISON INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS

Unit 1

- 2.57 Unit 1 (the maximum-security unit) is inhumane, not fit for purpose and needs to be rebuilt. This view was reflected in comments throughout the inspection by members of management, staff and prisoners alike. Accordingly, the prison had developed a business plan for a new unit.²⁶
- 2.58 Space in the Unit 1 cells did not meet minimum international standards. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment recommends a minimum of six square metres (sqm) for single cells, and 4 sqm per person in a shared space, and regarded 9 to ten sqm as a desirable size for a single cell.²⁷ The Australian and New Zealand guidelines set a minimum of 7.5 sqm for a single cell.²⁸ The Unit 1 cells – at 5.98 sqm, were too small for 'single occupancy' by these guidelines, yet were frequently being used to house two.



Photo 2 : A double-bunked cell in the maximum security Unit 1.

26 DCS, *Facility site audit for Strategic Asset Plan – Bunbury*, email submission, 24 August 2012.

27 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime & International Committee of the Red Cross, *Handbook on Strategies to Reduce Overcrowding in Prisons*, 2013, 10; *European Prison Rules*, Rule 18, commentary.

28 Victoria, Office of Corrections, *Standard Guidelines for Prison Facilities in Australia and New Zealand*, 1990 – as referenced by *Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia* (Revised 2012).

- 2.59 The International Committee of the Red Cross and others have pointed out that factors other than floor space also affect the acceptability of living conditions.²⁹ This was highly relevant in Unit 1. For example, the mattresses in the observation cells were reportedly mouldy because they were not aired out often enough, as observation cells were in constant use. Unit 1 also reportedly suffered from condensation throughout the winter, when the walls would become wet as a consequence of the overcrowding. Prisoners in this unit also lacked sufficient recreation facility and services, with the unit yard being cage-like and cramped. In the context of these multiple negative factors, even the standard minimal cell space in Unit 1 would have been insufficient for humane treatment.
- 2.60 Unit 1 is also unfit for purpose in that it does not permit the segregation of different cohorts of prisoners. The unit often housed 25 or more prisoners in a constantly changing mix of protection prisoners, prisoners on closed regimes, and remandees.³⁰ The unit has a six-cell area at the end of a wing behind a grill. This area was sometimes used to segregate prisoners, including for protection purposes. However, it did not prevent other prisoners from being able to intimidate them through the grill. When officers moved a prisoner from the protected area through the corridor they needed to close down the other cells. Insufficient separation of space made the mixed population difficult to manage.

Recommendation 6

Replace Unit 1 with appropriate, contemporary accommodation that meets the security, safety, and personal needs of the different groups of prisoners held there.

Unit 2

- 2.61 The cells in Unit 2 (the prison's standard accommodation unit) were also inadequate. These cells, which were often shared by two people, had a total area of only 5.92 sqm and floor space of just 4.6 sqm (2.3 sqm per person when the cell was shared). The cells also had poor airflow. Australian and New Zealand standards require either a window opening to fresh air, or air-conditioning, these cells had neither.³¹ As such, the Unit 2 cells were also ill-suited for sharing, and failed to meet both national and international standards. Given that most cells in this unit were being shared, it may be advisable to reduce the prison population when possible, ideally towards the single occupancy design capacity of 68 prisoners for this unit.

29 International Committee of the Red Cross, *Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons 'Supplementary Guidance'* 2012.

30 Prisoners are managed on a hierarchy of regimes setting out their privileges and standards of accommodation. These regimes range from the most privileged regime (known as 'enhanced'), through to 'standard', 'basic', and – at the lowest end of the scale – 'closed'.

31 Victoria, Office of Corrections, *Standard Guidelines for Prison Facilities in Australia and New Zealand*, 1990. In its response to a draft of this report DCS noted that '[T]here is a mechanical ventilation system in place' but this is not compliant with the Standards stated.



Photo 3 : A double-bunked cell in Unit 2.

Other Infrastructure Needs

2.62 The administration team has seriously outgrown their office space. The security office was particularly cramped, and it would better serve as office space for the overcrowded administration team. This will be particularly relevant if the prison employs new management staff such as an ASOS and an industries manager. As discussed in the following chapter, the prison also needs a new gatehouse and sally port.

Chapter 3

PROVIDING A SAFE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT

- 3.1 Physical safety, positive relations between staff and prisoners, and positive engagement with prison life are all necessary components of a constructive environment in which prisoners can pursue their rehabilitation and preparation for reintegration.
- 3.2 This chapter outlines Bunbury's provision of a safe, respectful, and constructive environment. The chapter first examines the prison's physical security measures before examining relational cultural and procedural security.

BACKGROUND

Safety

- 3.3 This inspection found that Bunbury had good levels of prisoner safety, with low levels of critical incidents and self-harm events. There were just five critical incidents involving assaults of prisoners or staff recorded for the first half of 2014. Correspondingly, 83 per cent of surveyed prisoners 'mostly felt safe', compared to a state average over the last three years of 67 per cent.
- 3.4 In the pre-inspection surveys, 92 per cent of staff respondents reported feeling safe. However, 86 per cent reported that physical abuse of staff by prisoners occurred 'sometimes' (an increase of nine percentage points from 2011). Some staff believed that understaffing was undermining safety and security.

Hierarchical Management

- 3.5 A constructive prison culture requires a good hierarchical regime to assist with the management of prisoners. Such a regime includes the use of varied privileges and accommodation enabling prisoners to be progressed for good behaviour, and regressed when their behaviour needs further management. Because of crowding, Bunbury lacked sufficient management facilities for regression, or sufficient single cells for progression. This restricted hierarchical management options.
- 3.6 Commendably, the prison was conducting a management review of its hierarchical regime through consultation with a custodial officer group and two prisoner groups: the Prison Council (which represented all units), and the Aboriginal Reference Group. The review aimed to provide 12 additional single cells on an earned basis, by increasing the sharing of cells in Unit 2 (the standard accommodation) and reducing cell-sharing in Unit 3 (the self-care accommodation).³² The review also proposed to dedicate one house in Unit 3 to Aboriginal prisoners, and to increase the range of privileges that could be used to reward or regress prisoners in accordance with their behaviour.³³ Ideally, the prison needed to reduce its prison population to be able to provide sufficient differentiation in accommodation.³⁴ However, its efforts to work within the reality of a prisoner population well above design levels were commendable.

32 Unit 2's population capacity was to increase from 96 to 102, with Unit 3's to reduce from 110 to 104.

33 DCS, Bunbury Accommodation Recommendation Approval Doc for LCC and Head Office, 20 October 2014.

34 At the time of writing the prison had requested a reduction of 40 prisoners from Unit 3, which would allow this self-care unit to return to its single occupancy cell design.

Inadequate Perimeter Security and the Drug Trafficking Problem

- 3.7 In April 2014, an undercover police task force reportedly found that the state's prisons were 'awash with drugs'.³⁵ Security and custodial staff told this Office that this problem was acute at Bunbury and that the prison also had problems with tattoo paraphernalia and phones. The Department's drugs statistics report confirmed there was high drug use at Bunbury, which produced the highest proportion of positive results among West Australian prisons for prisoners subject to prevalence testing on four specific dates in 2014. The results were more than twice as bad as the state averages. Incident reports for 2014 confirmed a high number of mobile phones were discovered in the prison.
- 3.8 During the inspection, management and staff at Bunbury stated that the prison was constantly battling the trafficking of contraband, particularly drugs and mobile phones. They identified particular issues that made this difficult to arrest. While these are not detailed for security purposes, the issues have been discussed with Bunbury Prison management and were also highlighted to the Department in the draft report.
- 3.9 However while it is always important to reduce the supply of contraband into a prison, there should also be a more concerted effort and focus on reducing demand. This is particularly so when identified factors contributing to supply cannot be immediately addressed.

SECURITY STAFFING AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Staffing

- 3.10 The Security team consisted of a Security Manager, two security Senior Officers, a level one administrative assistant, a dog handler and a drug detection dog. This Office was informed that the two Senior Officers, both very experienced, had been acting on a long term basis following an expression of interest. Given they had started acting prior to the 2011 inspection, and given Bunbury's challenges, these positions were clearly necessary. These positions should therefore have been substantively filled, but head office had not approved permanent positions.
- 3.11 This Office previously noted that requirements relating to collection and analysis of intelligence had increased, as had the need to provide better quality reports. The effectiveness of Bunbury's team would be complemented by providing an Intelligence Coordinator or collator.³⁶ A collator will help the security team optimise its use of the Department's intelligence database to identify and reduce risks, provide better informed intelligence strategy, and enhance intelligence awareness among staff. The collator would be particularly valuable as the prison's contraband problem created a high information workload for the security team. The security team stated that they had a good relationship with the Corrective Services Intelligence Directorate (CSID) who provide intelligence services and support all custodial facilities.³⁷

35 DCS, 'State Drugs Statistics Report', 13/01/2015; ABC online, 'WA prisons awash with drugs; Corrective Services Minister Joe Francis feels 'vindicated'', 8 April 2014 <<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-08/wa-prisons-awash-with-drugs-joe-francis-feels-vindicated/5374328>>, cited on 22 May 2014.

36 The Department supported this development in DCS, *2014 Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison, Department of Corrective Services Submission*, October 2014, Recommendation 5.

37 See [3.30]–[3.31].

- 3.12 The prisoner mix and poor physical state of Unit 1 has presented significant security challenges. However, when staffing numbers were low, staff from Unit 1 were often utilised in other areas of the prison, or for an external escort. This placed more pressure on staff in Unit 1 and increased the risk of mistakes. Prisoners were more reliant on staff in this unit for their daily routines, and were a more volatile mix than prisoners in other units. This busy and high-risk unit required planning and knowledge to run efficiently. For these reasons, staff should not be redeployed from this area. Dedicated staffing would also enable better management of Unit 1 prisoners.

Perimeter Fencing and Camera Coverage

- 3.13 The perimeter fence (hereafter the ‘perimeter’) was adequate to hamper or prevent escape. However, there were a number of areas of concern. For security reasons they are not detailed here but they have been reported to prison and Department management.
- 3.14 The inspection identified a number of areas of the main prison and the PRU that have inadequate camera coverage. Some of these areas also have limited line of sight view by prison officers carrying out their normal duties. The prison is aware of some of these and is actively working towards correcting this without the funding for new or additional cameras.

Gatehouse, Sally Port and Control Rooms

- 3.15 The gatehouse is out-dated. The narrow walk-through area was constricted, and the reception and sign-in desks protruded into the walk space. The window space (where keys are dispensed and retrieved) was cramped and its use conflicted with access to the exit door. The prison had developed improvement proposals, including reducing the size of one of the desks. However, the minor scope of planned work would not be sufficient to address the lack of space.
- 3.16 The main task for the control room officer should be monitoring of cameras, alarms and communications, and control of the main gates. Bunbury’s control officer was also tasked with handing out keys and personal alarms to staff. These tasks often took the officer away from the desk and the monitors, although at the busiest times another officer sometimes (but not always) assisted the control room officer by handling the key and alarm issue.
- 3.17 The control room monitors were arranged around the room, requiring the officer to physically move to see some of them. This made it hard for the control room officer to focus on all areas while managing the gate, the alarm and key issue. They should be positioned so that the officer can see them all at the same time.
- 3.18 With the high volume of traffic through the sally port and the gatehouse the control room position was busy. A queue of officers at the window frequently filled the gatehouse to a point where people were forced to shuffle past each other. There needed to be a separate key space and system so that the control room officer could focus on monitoring the cameras. The prison’s recent submission for a second control room officer would help overcome the risks incurred by the high level of multiple tasks and the poor layout.

- 3.19 Search rooms should have space for three people: two officers and the person being searched. The search room in the Bunbury gatehouse was too small for three people. There was no walk-through scanner in the gatehouse and the gatehouse lacked an x-ray machine to scan bags and other items. Metal detection wandings were undertaken, but this obstructed movement through the gatehouse. A walk-through scanner and x-ray machine would enhance security but there may not be enough room for such equipment within the current gatehouse configuration.
- 3.20 The visits process through the gatehouse was also hampered in some respects. There was little room for visitors to be searched by the drug detection dog, and the gatehouse became very congested during the movement of visitors.
- 3.21 The sally port has a sunken pit where officers used to inspect the underside of vehicles as they entered and exited the prison. The pit was no longer used due to OS&H issues. Instead, officers used a mirror trolley to observe vehicles' undercarriages. However, there were no clear procedures in place in the event that an item was found. Such procedures need to be developed.
- 3.22 The sally port was busy throughout the day with vehicles taking goods in and out of the prison. Ideally, movements in and out of a sally port will be conducted when prisoners are secured, thus reducing the risk of any escape. It would appear beneficial for Bunbury to conduct a review of movements through the sally port to minimise the number of movements at times when prisoners are not secured.
- 3.23 In 2011, this Office found that the reception sally port area (separate to the gate house sally port) was not sufficiently secure, and recommended that it be upgraded.³⁸ This had not occurred. As in other prisons, prisoner transport vehicles were too large for the sally port, and prisoners therefore had to embark and disembark in an area outside the secure sally port. The Department's submission to the Office accepted that it needed to conduct further risk assessments and to review its fleet and infrastructure to ensure that vehicles can enter sally ports. This needs to be actioned.

Cameras and the Security Office

- 3.24 Inadequate recording camera coverage in some areas of the prison was generating security and evidential risks. This was raised with the Security Manager, including specific areas where it was found, and highlighted to the Department as a concern with recommendations that this should be rectified for the good order and security of the prison.
- 3.25 The security office space was too small and was poorly located in the centre of the administration building, away from the main part of the prison. The security area was only accessible through a number of grilles, and both the office and the grilles could be observed by prisoners. It was therefore difficult for staff take prisoners into a private space and to interview them discreetly.

38 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) 13; Recommendation 3. In its 2011 response, the Department stated that funding this infrastructure 'would not be a priority in the near future'. No application was put forward in the period since the previous inspection.

Recommendation 7

Develop and implement improved processes for the current gatehouse, control room and sally port, to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of Bunbury's procedural security.

Recommendation 8

Undertake infrastructure improvements to the gatehouse, control room, sally port and security office to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of Bunbury's physical security.

RELATIONAL AND CULTURAL SECURITY

Relational Security

- 3.26 Relational security consists of the constructive use of the knowledge and understanding staff have of prisoners, based on regular positive interaction between prisoners and officers.³⁹ Officers who actively engage and interact with prisoners can develop respectful relationships that enhance the safety and constructiveness of the prison environment.
- 3.27 Commendably, 84 per cent of surveyed prisoners reported having good relations with unit officers, with only five per cent reporting poor relations. This compared very well with the state average over the past three years of 51 per cent. It was also much better than the 39 per cent figure in 2011. These survey findings were confirmed by observations of staff-prisoner relations throughout the inspection and during liaison visits. Independent Visitors also reported positive dynamics. The generally positive relations were reflected in low rates of use of force and restraint (see below).
- 3.28 Sound intelligence practices were producing some good results, including the detection of drugs, phones and a planned escape attempt. The security team encouraged all staff to be involved in intelligence gathering and recording. Regular informal meetings included the Senior Officers and sometimes shift officers, and there were monthly formal security meetings with the Senior Officers. The security team also distributed bulletins to inform staff of risks.
- 3.29 Intelligence gathering and security risk assessment have a central as well as a local dimension. As noted previously, the security team stated that they had a good relationship with the Department's Corrective Service Intelligence Directorate (CSID). However upon questioning if CSID visited the prison on a regular basis, it was stated that the CSID member dealing with Bunbury had only visited on one occasion at the invitation of the prison.
- 3.30 Whilst it is recognised that CSID provide good service and information to the prison this could be enhanced by CSID members attending all prisons on a regular basis to establish a rapport with the administration, the security staff and officers. These visits should also be utilised as a training opportunity and to better familiarise themselves with the prison, its layout and operational idiosyncrasies. CSID staff would then have a more intricate

³⁹ Her Majesty's Government (United Kingdom), Department of Health, *See, Think, Act: Your Guide to Relational Security*, 2010.

understanding of the possible implications of information contained in intelligence reports it receives from the prison. This could even be extended to reciprocated visits by local prison security staff as a training and development opportunity to better understand how CSID operate and the importance of the information they provide. This suggested practice has occurred in the past and was found to be beneficial to all parties.

Cultural Security

- 3.31 21 per cent of the prison population was Aboriginal at the time of the inspection, and good relational security therefore needed to include ‘cultural security’. Cultural security exists when Aboriginal prisoners feel safe in their social and cultural practices and confident in their interactions with staff. It also requires staff to respect and understand Aboriginal social practices and cultural beliefs.⁴⁰
- 3.32 The pre-inspection prisoner survey suggested a marked reduction in how prisoners rated staff behaviours in this respect. ‘Staff understanding culture’ had fallen from 41 per cent of prisoners surveyed in 2011 to 28 per cent in 2014, while ‘culture respected by staff’ had fallen from 42 per cent to 33 per cent. The inspection itself also indicated a lack of cultural awareness among some staff.
- 3.33 Prisons with good levels of cultural security, such as the West Kimberley Regional Prison, demonstrate high levels of constructive engagement by Aboriginal prisoners, and low levels of incidents and charges.⁴¹ Bunbury prison managers acknowledged the difficulty of creating positive engagement with Aboriginal men in custody, particularly young men. Accordingly, the prison was developing strategies for better engagement with Aboriginal prisoners, including improved hierarchical management (see also Chapter 6). This Office supports such initiatives to enhance safety and security and to encourage Aboriginal men to engage in rehabilitation and reintegration.

PROCEDURAL SECURITY

Drug Trafficking

- 3.34 The prison appeared to have good control of visits, and there was a high rate of discovery based on intelligence. These strengths, however, were insufficient to prevent contraband, and in particular drugs, entering the prison. As has been discussed above, a number of issues relating to the availability of contraband are not detailed in this report, but have been raised with local and Departmental management.

Searching

- 3.35 Visitors were searched on a random basis unless targeted through Intelligence. Search methods included metal detector wand, pat-down searches, strip searches, and drug detection dog searches. The wand of visitors was conducted respectfully. The gatehouse room for strip searches was not sterile and was too small, making it difficult to conduct strip searches properly.

40 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of West Kimberley and Broome Regional Prisons*, Report No. 96 (March 2015) 13–14. Wilkes, E., et al. ‘Substance Misuse and Mental Health among Aboriginal Australians’, in N. Purdie, P. Dudgeon & R. Walker (Eds.), *Working Together: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Mental Health and Wellbeing Principles and Practice*, 117–133, Barton, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia (2010).

41 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of West Kimberley and Broome Regional Prisons*, Report No. 96 (March 2015) 13.

- 3.36 A drug detection dog was used to search visitors at the main prison and the PRU. The inspection did, however, identify a number of issues related to this arrangement which have been confidentially raised with the prison for them to address.
- 3.37 PRU prisoners pose a particular potential risk of drug trafficking because of their access to external activities, the risk of pressure from prisoners in the main prison, frequent PRU prisoner movements through the gatehouse to the main prison and a number of other security issues that have been confidentially identified to the prison and Department. PRU prisoners moving into the main prison were pat-down searched on a random basis. Targeted pat-down searches or strip searches were also used following intelligence. Bunbury had sensibly tried to reduce the movement of PRU prisoners through the main gate, in order to reduce the trafficking risks.
- 3.38 Staff entering the prison were searched in accordance with Departmental policy⁴² but not all staff bags were searched.

Urine Testing

- 3.39 Urine testing was conducted within the Department's prevalence testing regime which involves a random selection of prisoners. Bunbury has experienced a high level of positive results through this testing. Bunbury also conducted targeted tests on prisoners highlighted through intelligence or unusual behaviour.
- 3.40 Discussions with prisoners indicated that 'Subutex' (Buprenorphine) was the drug of choice for many prisoners. As with all prisons there was no prevalence testing for this drug, as it is a more recently introduced drug and its testing is significantly more expensive than for other drugs. However, as with all prisons, Bunbury regularly performed targeted tests and these had resulted in 34 charges for use of Buprenorphine in 2013 and 22 charges in 2014 (up until 2 November). As Buprenorphine is prisoners' preferred drug of use, its inclusion in the targeted testing regime across all prisons should be considered.
- 3.41 Whilst the number of positive drug test results for Buprenorphine and other drugs dropped from 2013 to 2014, drugs are clearly still finding their way into the prison in concerning quantities. This would suggest that the concentration on supply prevention strategy alone is inadequate and that there should be a stronger incorporation of demand reduction.⁴³ Although the prison's health team provided some good services, a residential drug rehabilitation program with support for community re-entry could assist in providing better results.⁴⁴

42 DCS, Policy Directive 26; Operational Instruction 17.

43 Both Acacia and Casuarina prisons were also regarded as having drug use, trafficking and related problems in 2013 and 2014 despite comprehensive supply reduction practices.

44 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Acacia Prison*, Report No. 90 (June 2014) 59. See also S Carruthers, *An Independent Evaluation of the Acacia Prison Drug Strategy and the Current Supply, Demand and Harm Reduction Strands*, National Drug Research Institute, Curtin University (September 2013).

Disciplinary Measures and Use of Force

- 3.42 In 2014, 59 per cent of surveyed prisoners felt officers applied the rules fairly, compared to 41 per cent in the previous inspection. Bunbury was following the Department's processes for charging and punishing prisoners, and punishment through loss of privileges appeared proportionate. Many of the punishments, such as loss of electrical items in cells, reflected the prison's reinvigorated hierarchal system.
- 3.43 Bunbury's longstanding practice had been to send prisoners charged with a third drug offence to an outside court. This usually resulted in these prisoners getting more time added to their sentence. At the time of the inspection, this practice had recently stopped and such offences were being handled in-house.
- 3.44 The use of force, weapons and restraints are options of last resort for the control of threats. Such action should only be taken where efforts to control a situation through non-physical interventions have failed. Bunbury made little use of force because officers talked prisoners down where possible. This low use of force corresponds to the positive staff-prisoner relations noted above.
- 3.45 However, the prison was required by Departmental policy to have minimum-security prisoners escorted in restraints. This policy was, at times, both illogical and inefficient. For example, a prisoner might be free to undertake community work or to ride a bike to a workplace in the community on one day, but have to submit to wearing restraints to attend hospital or a funeral on another. This report makes no specific recommendations but repeats the view expressed in the recent West Kimberley Regional Prison report that the Department should 'revise the blanket policies which require restraints to be used on all prisoners attending funerals and medical treatment, adopting a more nuanced approach to risk management, including recognition of minimum-security status or section 95 approval'.⁴⁵

Complaints and Grievances

- 3.46 Most prisoners stated that they could talk to officers and usually resolved things in this way. They said there were only a few officers they could not approach and they avoided them where possible. Prisoners stated that the Department's Administration of Complaints, Compliments and Suggestion telephone system (ACCESS) was responsive. However, some prisoners thought that officers read their yellow envelopes and lacked confidence in the written complaints system for external bodies such as the Ombudsman. Only 15 per cent of surveyed prisoners would turn to external agencies such as the Ombudsman for assistance.

Emergency Management

- 3.47 Since the 2011 inspection, emergency exercises have included the management of perimeter breaches (with two live exercises), the management of possible deaths in custody, fires, roof ascents, and procedures for an evacuation. The prison was on-track to have delivered six by the end of 2014, a requirement of the Department's *Emergency Management Framework*.⁴⁶

45 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of West Kimberley and Broome Regional Prisons*, Report No. 96 (March 2015) Recommendation 13.

46 DCS, *Policy Directive 72 'Emergency Management – Superintendent's Responsibilities and Exercise Management'*, section 5.1.

Chapter 4

WELLBEING AND HEALTH

- 4.1 This chapter examines the living conditions and services that contribute to prisoners' physical and mental health, and wellbeing.

LIVING CONDITIONS

- 4.2 Living conditions include both the basic material aspects of everyday life such as food and clothing, and the more immaterial aspects such as access to social support and recreation. Both aspects contribute to prisoners' health and wellbeing, and to their ability to work towards rehabilitation and reintegration.

Food, Clothing and Accommodation Conditions.

- 4.3 Eighty-three per cent of prisoners surveyed reported that the quality of food was good, and 80 per cent reported that the amount was good, findings that were confirmed in discussion with prisoners during the inspection. These results compared well with state averages over the last three years, with just 39 per cent of prisoners across the State reporting that they were happy with the quality of prison food, and only 46 per cent reporting being happy with food quantities.
- 4.4 A cycle of receiving dirty clothing and bedding, laundering these and then re-distributing them to the prisoners operated seamlessly. As well as good laundry processes, prisoner clothing and bedding was in good condition and of adequate supply. Providing doonas and covers to prisoners as part of the standard bedding issue was good practice. There was also an effective clothing exchange system in place for prisoners to swap damaged or worn clothing for new clothing.

Reception and Orientation

- 4.5 Bunbury's reception processes appeared to function well. The reception facility was cramped but well-ordered. Two reception Vocational Support Officers (VSOs) undertook most reception activities, including managing prisoner property. The Orientation Officer met newly received prisoners with a welcome pack which included an Orientation Booklet. Too few prisons provide a written handbook, so this was good practice. The officer checked if prisoners' families knew they had come into prison, and on other prisoner issues. A peer support prisoner also provided support and guidance, including assistance with phone contact forms, the Orientation Booklet, and applying for support for any outstanding fines.
- 4.6 The Orientation Officer worked through the Orientation Check List with the prisoner, generally within the first 72 hours of his reception. The List covered behavioural expectations and prisoner services and organised check list services meeting. The check list meeting provided an opportunity for new prisoners to meet the Transition Manager, the re-entry service provider AccordWest, a chaplain, the Prison Support Officer and a peer supporter. This was followed by a facility tour with the Orientation Officer and peer supporter. Unfortunately, the Orientation Officer was sometimes redeployed as a result of staff shortages, which made it hard to complete the work required.

Having a Voice: Raising Issues and Seeking Responses

- 4.7 Prison is an authoritarian system in which staff and management control highly regimented regimes. Effective mechanisms for prisoners to have a voice provide valuable checks and balances.
- 4.8 Bunbury initiated a Prison Council in 2012. The council gave prisoners the opportunity to have a voice and raise issues.⁴⁷ Monthly meetings brought together prison management and prisoner representatives from all areas of the prison to discuss prison issues. The council meetings were minuted and prison management were required to provide the prisoner group with responses to their questions.
- 4.9 This representative process enhanced prison management by providing better communication and reduced misunderstanding or inconsistency. The process was observed to have been working well, although representatives experienced frustration with the length of time taken for management to respond to their issues. Commendably, the council members disseminated the meeting issues in 'The Insider', a high-quality prison newspaper. However, for these processes to maintain credibility, it is important that prisoners feel that prison management is responsive and that follow-up actions are communicated.

Recreation



Photo 4 : The oval in the main prison. There is no such facility for the PRU.

- 4.10 Since the 2011 inspection the provision of recreation had been poor. The pre-inspection prisoner survey showed prisoners' satisfaction with organised sport had fallen from 49 to 45 per cent, and satisfaction with other recreation had dropped from 38 to 32 per cent (much lower than the state average of 43% for the last three years).

⁴⁷ Acacia Prison, Albany Regional Prison, Casuarina Prison, and Pardelup Prison Farm also have Prison Councils (sometimes called 'forums').

- 4.11 The prison had not been supporting external sports for minimum-security prisoners, despite such external activities being a key component of reintegration activities. Interviews with PRU prisoners during the inspection indicated frustration and disappointment at the lack of opportunities to access external recreation. The prison said it intended to provide more external recreation in future, including fishing, crabbing, and swimming.
- 4.12 Recreation was understaffed, with only two recreation officers to cover both the main facility and the Pre-Release Unit (PRU). By contrast, Wooroloo Prison Farm, a comparable male prison in terms of its numbers, had three recreation officers. As with a number of other areas of operation, recreation staff were regularly redeployed to cover staffing shortfalls in custodial areas.
- 4.13 Recreation was not being used to provide training for prisoners. This compares poorly with other prisons that provide training opportunities including coaching and pathways to post-release employment and community activities. Wooroloo Prison Farm, for example, facilitates the innovative V Swans activities, training through the West Australian football league, and Community Sport and Recreation training provided by the recreation officer.⁴⁸ However, plans to provide skipper's ticket training in future were commendable, as this training is relevant to post-release employment in the region.
- 4.14 Recreation options in Unit 1 were limited to use of an enclosed yard, and simple indoor games. Unit 2 had isometric exercise equipment, but prisoners complained that they were not allowed to use the equipment outside of designated recreation times. This meant that prisoners who had finished work sometimes had no constructive activities to pursue while in the unit. Unit 3 (self-care) had a small gym where the small range of exercise machinery was barely functional. Prisoners drew attention to the limited exercise equipment, and called for cable weight machines, gloves, and focus mitts, similar to those provided at the PRU. The oval was well-maintained, and prisoners were observed engaging in football, cricket, walking and jogging during the inspection. PRU prisoners were permitted to compete with main facility prisoners on the oval on some weekends.



Photo 5 : The outdoor 'exercise' area in Unit 1.

48 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Wooroloo Prison Farm*, Report No. 80 (August 2012) 23–24.

WELLBEING AND HEALTH



Photo 6 : The gym/recreation yard in Unit 2.



Photo 7 : The gym in Unit 3 (self-care).

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- 4.15 Recreation included fortnightly bingo, weekly football tipping, and daily low impact group exercise for over 50s (although participation rates in the latter were low). Unit-based activities included tennis, pool, table tennis, darts and badminton, with monthly competitions. The main prison library was available for all prisoners for 90 minutes daily, after working hours. Books, DVDs and computer-based legal information were provided. Prisoners reported that they would like more library access, especially for those studying.
- 4.16 During the inspection, there were prisoner concerns that sex offenders felt too intimidated to engage in recreation in the gym (see also Chapter 5). The prison had supplied Wii-Fit for prisoners who preferred to exercise in their houses, but uptake had reportedly been poor.
- 4.17 Prisoners said that overweight and older prisoners needed help to work towards basic fitness and would benefit from equipment like treadmills, elastic stretch equipment, and medicine balls. A prisoner with a qualification in fitness training had reportedly been offering circuit training three times a week, but had stopped due to a lack of equipment. A prisoner recreation worker could provide group fitness training on a more inclusive basis, including older prisoners and sex offenders.

Recommendation 9

Increase the range and frequency of recreational options at Bunbury, including the provision of external activities for PRU prisoners and opportunities for prisoners to gain formal recreation qualifications.

Visits and Outside Contacts

- 4.18 The main prison visits area was typical of facilities across the state. Although it had a covered roof and a children's play area, it had only basic facilities, was closed in, and felt sterile.
- 4.19 In contrast, the newer PRU visits room was well-lit by windows overlooking landscaped grounds. Nonetheless, airflow was restricted in the PRU visits, and on hot days the space was stuffy. Hard surfaces and children created high background noise levels, making it difficult to enjoy private conversations. There was a view that being able to sit outside would have been preferable, and the area outside the visits room appeared amenable to adaption for this purpose.
- 4.20 The planned provision of 'E-Visits' using Skype or other formats will also help. All prisons in the state, including Bunbury, should innovatively expand the use of online technologies to facilitate family and community contact, official appointments, coverage of significant occasions and connection with communities. Bunbury was making progress, having built a visits' booth for Skype, and the Department had agreed to fund the ongoing IT costs. Unfortunately, though, Skype implementation had been delayed by technological problems caused by a lack of bandwidth.
- 4.21 Prisoners reported that the phones and the general mail system were working well at the time of the inspection. However, there were concerns that confidential mail was opened by prison officers, and prisoners reported being challenged by officers when submitting

grievances. Prisoners also reported having to ask officers for the confidential envelopes, as they were not otherwise available.

HEALTH AND MENTAL HEALTH

4.22 Prisoners have ‘high levels of mental health disorders, illicit substance use, chronic disease, communicable disease and disability’⁴⁹ and their health needs generally exceed those of the general community. The internationally accepted principle of equivalence requires that services in custody should not be less than those provided to an equivalent cohort of people in the community.⁵⁰

The Health Centres and Staffing

4.23 The health centres consist of a main facility in the medium-security prison and a smaller ‘satellite’ health centre in the PRU. Both are contemporary facilities with appropriate amenities and a fit for purpose design. Each had a suitable number of consulting rooms and work spaces. The main health centre also had a full dental suite.

4.24 The health centre had its full complement of FTE – including both medical and administrative staff. However, there were some concerns regarding staffing allocations for health assessments, and to address Aboriginal health (discussed further below). The staffing was an improvement on levels found during the previous inspection. Moreover, the health centre had greater stability because all positions were substantively filled.

4.25 The staff comprised a Clinical Nurse Manager (CNM) and four Clinical Nurses, a co-morbidity nurse, a mental health/Prison Addiction Services Team (PAST) nurse, and two medical receptionists. The health staffing also included three casual nurses who covered shifts and unused nursing hours, and provided sick leave and holiday relief. The centre was staffed seven days a week with reduced weekend staffing. It had the CNM, two nurses and two receptionists during the week, and one nurse over the weekend. The CNM reported that this was generally an adequate level of staffing.

4.26 From the time of the 2011 inspection to just before the current inspection, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) had funded Aboriginal re-entry support staff to work with prisoners to ensure continuity of health care upon discharge. Bunbury’s Aboriginal health re-entry worker had been highly valued by health staff. He had robust networks and relationships within the local community, to which many prisoners returned following release, and valuably assisted the PAST nurse with mental health patients in the lead-up to release. Unfortunately, this re-entry worker position no longer exists as the COAG funding has been withdrawn.

4.27 The role of the Aboriginal re-entry workers had been to ‘bridge the gap’ between prisons and communities, rather than providing health support. In contrast, Aboriginal health workers provide culturally appropriate care to Aboriginal prisoners during their time *in* prison. Unlike re-entry workers, Aboriginal health workers must be qualified

49 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, *The Health of Australia’s Prisoners 2012* (2013) 3. Unfortunately, only Western Australia participated in this study so this prevents accurate benchmarking against national data.

50 WHO Europe, *Promoting Health in Prisons: a WHO Guide to the Essentials in Prison Health* (2007) 27 accessed at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/99018/E90174.pdf

health professionals. The Department had not provided Bunbury with an Aboriginal health worker in the period since the last inspection, despite this Office's recommendation that it should do so.⁵¹ The Department had supported that recommendation 'in principle', claiming a shortage of Aboriginal health workers across public and private health sectors. The recommendation remains unaddressed and is even more important given the demise of the re-entry worker scheme. It is therefore reiterated here.

Recommendation 10

Recruit an Aboriginal Health Worker for Bunbury Regional Prison.

Access to the Health Centre

- 4.28 Bunbury used a telephone appointment system for most appointments. Prisoners in Unit 1 (the maximum-security unit) provided a card with their name on it to the medication nurses attending the unit, or verbally notified the nurse. Prisoners calling with urgent health problems such as chest pains would be seen immediately. Non-urgent phone calls were triaged according to the severity of the health issue and appointments scheduled accordingly. All medical appointments were conducted with a nurse in the first instance, who made a referral to other medical services as required.
- 4.29 The telephone booking system promotes personal responsibility among the prisoners, and is in keeping with community practices around managing one's own health. It removes problems caused by illiteracy, as no writing is involved, and thus ensures greater access. Further, it can, in some cases, reduce the demand on the health centre because some issues can be resolved over the telephone (such as a prisoner needing a renewal of his prescription medication).
- 4.30 Prisoners complained that the receptionists seldom answered the phone, and often diverted it to an answering machine. The inspection team examined these claims and found that while the receptionists answered the phone when they could, they sometimes had to prioritise other reception duties. The system worked in a timely fashion however; regardless of whether the call was answered in person or the message listened to later, an appointment was scheduled within two to three days (earlier if the matter appeared urgent).
- 4.31 Prisoners frustrated at not having their call answered in person would sometimes just hang up. Following prisoners' concerns, the health team considered putting up notices next to the telephones encouraging prisoners to leave a message. In lieu of more reception staff to answer the phone, this and any other improvements to encourage prisoners to engage with the booking system and health services would be valuable.
- 4.32 Prisoners also said they were reluctant to leave a message including details of their health complaint as they thought that the message would be loud enough for other people to hear when the medical receptionists played it. The CNM undertook to put in place measures to protect prisoners' privacy when staff listened to the voice messages.

51 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) Recommendation 14.

Services

- 4.33 Patients had adequate access to nursing clinics and medication in the main facility and PRU. However, doctor sessions had dropped from four to three days a week since the last inspection. When a doctor was required but not on-site, the e-consult system was well-utilised and effective.⁵²
- 4.34 Allied health services included:
- Dentist – who attended weekly;
 - Surgeon and physician – both attended approximately every two months;
 - Podiatrist and optometrist – attended every three months or as required depending on the number of prisoners requests; and
 - Ultrasound clinic – attended approximately every three months for a day.
- 4.35 Overall, the inspection found good coverage of both general and specialist medical services. There was pressure on the doctors to get through their lists given the loss of some sessions since the previous inspection. Nevertheless, prisoners were getting appointments within a reasonable timeframe. Further, the provision of specialist medical services – such as those of the surgeon – was good practice, and unique in the Western Australian prison system.
- 4.36 Unlike many other prisons, Bunbury lacked a physiotherapist to assist with injuries and recovery from surgery. This was particularly problematic as Bunbury held many older prisoners, who are more likely to require physiotherapy than younger men. Prisoners requiring physiotherapy had to be sent out of the prison to attend an external appointment, which was inconvenient and resource-intensive (because of the need to provide escort officers). Providing ‘in-house’ services would be more efficient and service more prisoners’ needs.
- 4.37 Prison-based dental services face significant pressures on their services because of the poor health profile of prisoners, and the health consequences of many prisoners’ histories of drug abuse. The dental service at Bunbury was inadequate. This is not a negative reflection on the dental professionals. Rather, it is a negative reflection of the inadequate funding arrangement which only allowed for once weekly dental services. Prisoners reported that the waiting time to see the dentist was too long, and some prisoners complained of unresolved dental pain. While the dentist was scheduled to attend once a week, this had recently been erratic. Health centre staff advised that, in urgent cases, prisoners would be sent out of the prison for dentistry. Those with chronic dental pain, however, were likely to have to continue to suffer with toothache. The Department’s Health Services Directorate should work with Dental Health WA to improve the provision of dental services at Bunbury.

Services for Prisoners Entering

- 4.38 Departmental policies state that all new admissions to prison must be assessed for risks to physical and mental health within 24 hours of reception, and an appointment with a doctor must be scheduled to occur within 28 days of admission.⁵³ The Department requires that ‘a full health screen’ should be conducted by health staff after the reception process is complete.⁵⁴ Where the full health screen identifies risks of self-harm or suicide, health staff are required to place the prisoner on the At Risk Management System.⁵⁵

52 The e-consult system is an online consultation between the doctor and patient.

53 DCS, *Health Services Procedure: PM01 Adult Admission and Risk Assessment* (6 October 2010).

54 DCS, Policy Directive 85, Prisoner Reception – Procedures, 3.6, Medical Screening.

55 Policy Directive 32, ARMS Manual, 3.2.1.2, Screening by Health Services on First Reception.

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- 4.39 At Bunbury, a nurse briefly administered an ‘after hours checklist’ in Unit 1 (the unit housing prisoners on reception). This generally occurred within the first few hours of a prisoner arriving at the unit, and after the reception process had been completed. The checklist provides information about the prisoner’s overall health profile, and information that may indicate that he needs immediate intervention. If so, the prisoner was taken to the health centre immediately. Otherwise, an appointment was made for the following day, where a full health assessment was performed. Snapshot evidence for the week of the inspection indicated that all prisoners were receiving the full assessment by or before the day following their reception.
- 4.40 A number of staff and management interviewed during the inspection felt that health staff should conduct the full health screen the same day, instead of the day following reception. Arguably, this would better meet the requirement of the Department’s policy on medical screening following reception, and alleviate the health risks that might occur overnight, as the initial checklist process may not identify some risks.⁵⁶ This could be achieved by having a nurse perform the assessment in the reception centre. However, this was not possible with the current nursing staff levels and the layout of the reception space which lacked a private space for screening patients. A lack of custodial staff availability also limited options for new prisoner assessments, especially in regard to their availability to escort prisoners to the health centre. Given these limitations, the existing processes were understandable. However, they did not appear to be without risk. Health Services staff and management need to continue to examine opportunities for improvement.

MENTAL HEALTH AND EMOTIONAL WELLBEING

- 4.41 Prisoners typically come from social groups that are disadvantaged in the community in terms of health and mental health care, with many having histories of substance abuse. Support for prisoners suffering mental and emotional vulnerability, and the enhancement of mental and emotional wellbeing, is provided through a combination of related services. This section will examine the operation of peer-to-peer support, the cross-department management of vulnerable prisoners, and counselling and mental health services.

Peer Support

- 4.42 The peer support system is a mechanism for prisoners to provide each other with emotional and practical support, particularly when prisoners are vulnerable to mental and emotional distress (as may be the case when they first come into prison). The peer support group is managed by a Prison Support Officer (PSO). This Office found that the PSO provided good service, was highly regarded by prisoners and staff, and well-supported by prison management.⁵⁷ The PSO was a Noongar elder who knew many community members throughout the South-West. He facilitated contact between them and prisoners, and made arrangements with family to collect prisoners on release.

56 DCS, Policy Directive 85, Prisoner Reception – Procedures, 3.6, Medical Screening.

57 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) 28.

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- 4.43 Peer support prisoners received Gatekeeper suicide prevention training and Mental Health First Aid training. The prison's stable peer support team meant the PSO could travel to other prisons to deliver the Gatekeeper course. The creation of a Prison Council to deal with prisoner issues, had freed up the peer support team to focus on care. While the peer support team was involved in helping new prisoners during their orientation, there was room for more involvement for the team in the orientation process.

Crisis Support for Mentally and Emotionally Vulnerable Prisoners

- 4.44 At risk and vulnerable prisoners are managed within the At Risk Management System (ARMS) and the Support and Monitoring System (SAMS).⁵⁸ ARMS is a multidisciplinary case management system for the identification, monitoring and management of prisoners identified as being at risk of self-harm. SAMS is a similar case management system for the identification and management of prisoners who are not an acute risk but require additional support, intervention and monitoring.
- 4.45 Bunbury has had low numbers of prisoners on ARMS and low rates of self-harm. The Prisoner Risk Assessment Group (PRAG) case managed prisoners on ARMS or SAMS. The inspection found that this group:
1. performed a comprehensive risk assessment on the prisoner;
 2. arranged for appropriate supports and interventions based on risk assessments;
 3. reviewed prisoners' progress – during the twice weekly meetings; and
 4. maintained a supervision log of all observations and contacts with the prisoner.⁵⁹
- 4.46 Bunbury's PRAG was chaired by the Assistant Superintendent (ASO) and comprised health services clinical staff, counselling and chaplaincy staff, the PSO, and Senior Officers. This integrated, team-based approach is good practice and the team was observed to work cooperatively and respectfully.
- 4.47 Prisoners with less acute mental health needs were supported by counsellors, the co-morbidity nurse, and the psychiatrist. The nurse provided advice, support and information and referrals to the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist attended the prison for two sessions per month, and was also available to be contacted at other times. The psychiatrist was locally based which was useful for locally residing prisoners who choose to continue their treatment on release. The Prison Counselling Service (PCS) provided counselling for prisoners with psychological issues. Commendably, they were able to provide ongoing support because the prison had low numbers of ARMS referrals.
- 4.48 The co-morbidity nurse worked with the Transitional Manager to assist prisoners with mental health needs in planning for their release. The lack of resources and support in the community for these prisoners, however, was a serious issue.

58 DCS, Policy Directive 32, Prisoners at Risk of Self Harm or Requiring Additional Support and Monitoring, May 2010.

59 DCS, Bunbury Regional Prison, *Prisoner Risk Assessment Group Quarterly Review* (9 July 2014).

Managing Addictions

- 4.49 Bunbury’s drug strategy was consistent with the Department’s *Drug and Alcohol Agency Action Plan 2010–2014*, which focused on supply reduction. However, supply reduction alone is never sufficient and Bunbury has not been able to prevent drugs entering the prison (see Chapter 3). Strategies to reduce demand and minimise harm are therefore particularly important.
- 4.50 Health treatment interventions included a detoxification program; an opiate replacement and maintenance program; an offender treatment program; community-provided support and counselling; and the Health-in-Prison-Health-out-of-Prison (HiP-HoP) program.⁶⁰ Holyoake had previously provided the popular Drumbeat addictions program, but were not able to do so at the time of the inspection.
- 4.51 The co-morbidity nurse managed the Methadone opiate replacement therapy program. The nurse interviewed patients regularly to discuss their dosages, and changes were referred to the doctors. The process for starting prisoners on Methadone was rigorous, with close monitoring for side effects. Prisoners experiencing drugs and alcohol withdrawal were managed by the co-morbidity and other nurses. They were assessed daily and saw a doctor within three to four days after entering prison. If they presented as at risk they were placed in observation cells, or could ‘buddy up’ with another prisoner for support.

Environmental Health

- 4.52 Overall the inspection found that the environmental health profile was decent. There were regular scheduled maintenance processes in place for environmental health. For example, the air-conditioning systems across the prison are tested and serviced annually and pest control services attend twice a year. Also, the prison conforms to the requirements for the management and removal of asbestos.

60 HiP-HoP was offered to newly received and soon to be released prisoners to educate them about impacts from diseases transmitted through sex and sharing of needles.

Chapter 5

SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY ISSUES FOR ABORIGINAL AND OTHER PRISONERS

- 5.1 This chapter examines the Department’s management of substantive equality for Aboriginal prisoners at Bunbury, in the context of the ongoing over-representation of Aboriginal people in the state’s prisons.⁶¹ The chapter also reflects on a number of issues facing long sentence prisoners and support for prisoners with a mental impairment.

POLICY FRAMEWORKS

- 5.2 Western Australia’s substantive equality service provision is guided by the 2010 *Policy Framework for Substantive Equality*.⁶² The recognition of the needs of diverse groups and individuals within an overall aim of achieving equality is acknowledged in policy frameworks and particular Departmental policies. The Department defines substantive equality as being ‘about treating people differently in order to cater for their needs to achieve equal outcomes’.⁶³ As such it takes into account ‘the effects of past discrimination and the differences in needs between groups and individuals to minimise unfair outcomes’.⁶⁴ It recognises that ‘rights, entitlements, opportunities and access are not equally distributed throughout society’ and that ‘equal or the same application of rules to unequal groups can have unequal results’.⁶⁵
- 5.3 Departmental policy guiding the equitable management of Aboriginal offenders includes the Department’s *Substantive Equality Policy* (2008), the *Aboriginal Impact Statement and Guidelines* (2009), and the *Operational Philosophy for the Management of Aboriginal Prisoners in Contact with Corrective Services* (2011). Under the *Substantive Equality Policy Framework* the Department is obliged to test all new policies and policy revisions against substantive equality principles, and embed the principles within all learning delivered by the Academy. Given the profile of people in custody it is extraordinary that the Department has not had a Reconciliation Action Plan, though on 10 April 2015 it released a Draft Reconciliation Action Plan on its website for comment.⁶⁶

AN UNDER-USED CAPACITY TO SUPPORT ABORIGINAL PRISONERS?

- 5.4 Bunbury’s Aboriginal population at the time of the inspection was under 25 per cent. This is less than the statewide average of 40 per cent but still calls for a special focus at the prison.
- 5.5 Most of the Aboriginal prisoners were Noongar people from the south-west and metropolitan areas. Given the good re-entry services provided to minimum-security prisoners at the Pre-Release Unit (PRU), and the needs of Aboriginal prisoners, it might be expected that the prison should hold more Noongar men than it does. Unfortunately, only eight of 67 minimum-security prisoners at Bunbury were Aboriginal at the time of the inspection.

61 DCS, *Overcoming Aboriginal Disadvantage: A Guide for Aboriginal Service Committees in WA Prisons* (May 2011).

62 Equal Opportunity Commission (WA), Substantive Equality Unit, *Policy Framework for Substantive Equality* (2010).

63 DCS, *Substantive Equality Policy* (2008).

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 <<http://www.correctiveservices.wa.gov.au/about-us/default.aspx#Reconciliation-Action-Plan>>

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- 5.6 A significant obstacle to Noongar men reaching the PRU is the Department's revised prisoner assessment and classification tool. Introduced in 2009 the tool led to a sharp and unanticipated decline in the number of Aboriginal prisoners progressing to minimum-security.⁶⁷ Other factors include Bunbury's role as a prison for prisoners engaging in sex offender treatment programs, and the distance from Perth.
- 5.7 As a result of the low number of Aboriginal prisoners at the PRU, too few Noongar prisoners were gaining access to external reintegration activities. At the time of the inspection the Department was undertaking a review of its assessment and classification tool. If substantive equality is to be supported, this review should take into account the work already undertaken by this Office and the Department itself in identifying some of the obstacles facing Aboriginal prisoners.
- 5.8 This is a very significant issue if the Department is to meet its core objective of enhancing public safety by reducing recidivism. However, this report does not make a formal recommendation because the Department recently supported a recommendation to similar effect, and expects to complete its review by mid-2015.

Overcoming Disadvantages

- 5.9 The Department recognises that addressing over-incarceration requires strategies to help overcome the multiple disadvantages suffered by Aboriginal people.⁶⁸ Its formal policies on overcoming Aboriginal prisoner disadvantage include a focus on overcoming unemployment, poor educational backgrounds, poor health, and inadequate housing.⁶⁹ The Department attempts to address such socioeconomic disadvantages within the prison system through employment, education and training programs, and health policies and practices. In line with Departmental objectives, substantive equality for Aboriginal prisoners was a key focus of Bunbury's 2013/14 business case.
- 5.10 Bunbury's constructive focus on substantive equality for Aboriginal prisoners was evident in a number of areas. For example, Noongar men were represented proportionally at most work sites; the PSO was enhancing staff understanding and respect for Aboriginal culture through training sessions; and prison management were driving a focus on respect and equality. However, some inequities remained, with Aboriginal men under-represented in self-care accommodation, higher gratuity payment levels, and external activities.
- 5.11 The prison was developing strategies designed to help overcome these inequities, and to enhance its work in supporting Aboriginal prisoners. Future plans (discussed in Chapter 6) included a workshop with a focus on supporting young Aboriginal men aged 18 to 24. The PRU planned to provide the Standing on Solid Ground program, which supports Aboriginal prisoners in emotional intelligence development, as a pathway to accredited courses under the Gaining Access to Education and Training program. The prison also had plans to progress more Aboriginal prisoners to self-care-accommodation (see below).

67 OICS, *The Flow of Prisoners to Minimum Security, Work Camps and Section 95 in Western Australia* (January 2013); DCS, *Aboriginal Prisoners at Minimum Security Prisons in the Metropolitan and South West Areas* (draft April 2013).

68 DCS, *Creating Value through Performance, Strategic Plan 2015-2018*; DCS, *Overcoming Aboriginal Disadvantage: A Guide for Aboriginal Service Committees in WA Prisons* (May 2011), foreword, 3.

69 DCS, *Overcoming Aboriginal Disadvantage: A Guide for Aboriginal Service Committees in WA Prisons* (May 2011).

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- 5.12 Bunbury's business case states that relevant actions include 'continued involvement by indigenous prisoners in section 95 activities; use of opportunities that focus on indigenous prisoners being involved in external work activities; and indigenous prisoner involvement in vocational training'.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, the measure for success is set very low, that is that the 'number of indigenous prisoners in external work teams (is) not to drop lower than one'.⁷¹ While the prison generally achieved this measure, such minimal expectations are wholly inadequate if the reintegration needs of Aboriginal prisoners are to be met. If the Department is to meet its strategic objective of reducing recidivism, the performance indicator should be lifted and should include participation in vocational training.
- 5.13 Shortly before the inspection, local media reported that the Department supported in principle an initiative by local Noongar elders to establish a halfway house for young Aboriginal men leaving prison in the Bunbury region.⁷² This initiative aimed to reduce recidivism rates by providing supported reintegration, rather than leaving Aboriginal prisoners to face the problems that often lead to further crime and incarceration alone. This Office discussed the proposal with a range of community stakeholders and it was clear that there was widespread support for the development of a concrete proposal.

Cultural Security, Community Engagement

- 5.14 Cultural security is crucial to positive identity formation and participation in society. In prison cultural security is crucial to Aboriginal prisoners engaging successfully in rehabilitation and reintegration activities. West Australian prisons, including Bunbury, aim to ensure respect for and understanding of Aboriginal culture and social practices. Key actions supporting this aim include cultural awareness training, and the mainstreaming of respect for Aboriginal culture in operational policies and practices.
- 5.15 Prison management had ensured that Noongar men had a 'voice'. It had constituted an Aboriginal Reference Group (ARG) to assist with its hierarchical management review, and Noongar men were represented on the Prisoner Council. In particular, the ARG had been involved in the planning for an Aboriginal self-care house. This was a culturally and socially appropriate initiative, recognising that Aboriginal people value being together, and may resist progression if it means moving away from family. The prison had taken a holistic approach to its strategy to progress Aboriginal prisoners, and planned to link the privileged accommodation to education and training programs.
- 5.16 The Aboriginal Visitors Scheme continued to have a valuable presence at the prison. The peer support process had developed since 2011, with improved representation by Aboriginal prisoners. In the pre-inspection prisoner survey, 'trust in peer support' had risen from 24 to 45 per cent, 'trust in the PSO' from 6 to 22 per cent, and 'trust in the Aboriginal Visitors Scheme' from 5 to 17 per cent. These results were equal to or higher than the state average over the last three years. The PSO, a local Noongar elder with strong community links, also provided cultural awareness training to staff.

70 *Bunbury Regional Prison 2013-14 Business Case.*

71 *Ibid.*, 14.

72 Bunbury Mail, 'Elders push for prison halfway house in Bunbury', 27 August 2014.

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- 5.17 Despite this, however, the pre-inspection prisoner survey suggested a marked reduction in prisoner satisfaction with staff understanding of and respect for Aboriginal culture (see Chapter 3). During the inspection period, it also became clear that some staff did not support Departmental and prison-based principles of substantive equality.
- 5.18 Most of the treatment programs provided for Bunbury and other West Australian prisoners were developed with Western rather than Aboriginal cultural and social identities, beliefs, and practices in mind. While some of these, such as the Pathways program, were being adapted for the use of Aboriginal prisoners, the prison lacked access to other culturally appropriate Aboriginal-specific treatment and voluntary programs such as indigenous violence treatment programs, and the well-regarded Red Dust Healing program for Aboriginal men. The Red Dust Healing program tackles the hurt, anger, grief, and sense of loss suffered by Aboriginal people, using an Aboriginal cultural perspective. Disappointingly, there was no mention of services for Aboriginal prisoners in the prisoners' orientation booklet.

Funerals

- 5.19 The ARG raised the issue of funeral denials, and provided examples of perceived inappropriate refusals. This Office acknowledges that funeral transport presents some risk and resourcing difficulties, and that cost-effective support for prisoners and families is necessary. However, in restricting eligibility for funeral attendance to those with close blood ties, the policy was culturally inappropriate and insensitive, and failed to recognise Aboriginal social and kinship systems and networks.⁷³ There needs to be a review of transport arrangements and resourcing for funerals attendance. Recommendations have already been made in other reports and will not be repeated here.⁷⁴
- 5.20 The ARG also suggested that Skype could provide a supplementary support for grieving when prisoners are not allowed to attend funerals in the community. However, a small computer monitor would not be suitable for a large prisoner group. Aboriginal men at Bunbury described a previous Skype experience at another prison, with 10 men squeezed in a small room looking at a small screen. This was inappropriate, and facilities for using Skype for grieving need to be better configured. On one occasion, for example, Acacia Prison used a screen in the gymnasium.

RESOCIALISATION FOR LIFE AND INDEFINITE SENTENCE PRISONERS

- 5.21 Life and indefinite sentence prisoners sentenced under the provisions of the *Offenders Community Corrections Act (OCCA) 1963* are not eligible for participation in a resocialisation program (RSP) which is administered under section 13 of the *Sentence Administration Act 2003 (SAA)*. There is no alternative form of resocialisation program for these long serving prisoners that would allow them to spend time back in the community prior to potential release on parole.
- 5.22 According to Adult Custodial Rule 18, any life or indefinite sentenced prisoner must remain above minimum-security until the approval of their participation in an RSP. As prisoners subject to OCCA are not eligible for inclusion in a resocialisation program, they cannot progress to minimum-security. The issue impacts on all prisons, but Bunbury

⁷³ OICS, *Review of Funeral Attendances by Incarcerated People in Western Australia* (September 2013) iii.

⁷⁴ OICS, *ibid.*, and *Report of an Announced Inspection of West Kimberley and Broome Regional Prisons*, Report No. 96 (March 2015) 39.

houses a significant cohort of affected prisoners. At the time of the inspection, eight Bunbury prisoners were ineligible for an RSP because of the legislative limitations.

- 5.23 Clearly, not all prisoners sentenced under OCCA will be considered suitable for an RSP. However, they should at least be eligible to apply for inclusion in such a program. It is paradoxical that prisoners who are subject to the SAA, and who have served less time than those subject to OCCA, are eligible for an RSP but OCCA prisoners are not. The current restrictions also places undue restrictions on the Prisoners Review Board: it must either release the person without adequate re-entry preparation or must leave them in prison. It needs an option akin to the RSP.
- 5.24 This issue was raised at the 2011 inspection and the Office understands that in the second half of 2011, Cabinet approved the drafting of legislative amendments to enable OCCA prisoners to be eligible for a resocialisation program. At the time of writing, it was indicated that the relevant Ministers were considering possible amendments.
- 5.25 Given the lack of progress over a period of years, if legislative change is not forthcoming, other options should be sought. The Prisoners Review Board previously enabled such prisoners to access reintegration activities through what it called a 'Pre-release program' ('PRP'). This had no formal statutory basis but operated on the basis of intelligent collaboration between the Department, the Board and the relevant Ministers from whom approvals were needed. In most respects, it was exactly the same as an RSP. If legislation is not progressed, an administrative arrangement of this sort should be revived.

Recommendation 11

Make legislative change or implement administrative arrangements to ensure that all life sentence and indeterminate sentence prisoners can apply to the Prisoners Review Board for inclusion in a resocialisation or equivalent program.

SUPPORT FOR MENTALLY IMPAIRED PRISONERS

- 5.26 Bunbury had also developed a minor role in the specialised care and pre-release preparation of mentally impaired prisoners. Staff had developed specialised management plans, and prisoners were assisting. During liaison visits in 2014 this Office observed the commendable emotional and practical support provided by prisoners, including one prisoner having given up his single cell for a mentally impaired prisoner. The Greyhounds as Pets program run at the PRU included a mentally impaired prisoner in its activities, and had arranged for his potential involvement in greyhound fostering after release.
- 5.27 The Life Skills Officer provided dedicated support for mentally impaired prisoners, including those suffering from the effects of substance abuse. These prisoners were helped to engage with people and processes through cooking lessons. One prisoner who had not been speaking prior to being transferred to the PRU developed constructive engagement with fellow prisoners and staff following such help. These examples of specialised care involving prison management, staff, and prisoners were providing a more therapeutic environment for prisoners with complex needs to prepare for re-entry.

Chapter 6

SUPPORTING REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

- 6.1 This chapter examines support for prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration. It discusses: sentence planning and case management, treatment programs (including the degree to which program provision supports prisoners' reintegration needs), and the provision of education and training.

SENTENCE PLANNING AND CASE MANAGEMENT

- 6.2 Sentence planning processes are designed to plan for prisoners' progress through their sentences towards successful reintegration, including preparation for parole applications.⁷⁵ Sentence planning involves an assessment process for remandees and sentenced prisoners, including an initial Management and Placement (MAP) assessment, which identifies security ratings and placement within the prison system. Remandees and prisoners with sentences of six months or less only receive the MAP, but prisoners with sentences of six months or more receive an Individual Management Plan (IMP). The IMP involves a more comprehensive assessment of the prisoner's situation and focuses on their treatment program needs.
- 6.3 Bunbury has commenced implementation of a major change in treatment assessments that promised a better determination of the treatment needs of prisoners. A new assessment tool known as the Level of Service/Risk, Need, Responsivity (LS/RNR) checklist had been introduced. This tool had been used for most new treatment assessments in the three months prior to the inspection. This checklist has been used in other Australian jurisdictions, and the Department claims it has been normalised for Aboriginal people and women, as well as for mainstream offenders. It was too early in the prison's use of the LS/RNR to evaluate its use. However, as noted below, it has relevance for the Department's emerging Integrated Offender Management process.
- 6.4 The first stage of case management involves various assessments and the development of an IMP for qualifying prisoners.⁷⁶ Once prisoners have an IMP they become subject to the case management process. Each prisoner is allocated a case manager (usually a unit officer), who is responsible for supporting and informing the prisoner through the sentence and for the release process. The case manager should maintain regular communication with the prisoner, monitor their progress with their programs, their rehabilitation and reintegration needs and behaviour in prison.
- 6.5 The assessment team included a Case Management Coordinator and three writers. They were responsible for a range of activities including:
- conducting initial IMPs and IMP reviews;
 - management and placement (MAP) assessments for remandees and short-term sentenced prisoners;
 - classification reviews;
 - parole reports for the Prisoner Review Board;

75 DCS, 'Adult Custodial Rule 18' describes the procedures involved in the assessment and sentence management of prisoners.

76 Remandees and prisoners serving effective sentences of less than six months do not qualify for an IMP, but are processed through the Management and Placement checklist.

- reintegration leave applications;
 - vetting of Prisoner Employment Program (PEP) applications;
 - work camp assessments; and
 - applications from sex offender to allow a child to visit with them.
- 6.6 Case conference reports include prisoners' IMPs and security classification reviews. These informed prisoners' parole applications. Case management was well managed, and the responsibility was taken seriously by the custodial officers responsible for managing individual prisoners. Bunbury's practices were compliant with the Department's policy, including contact form check-listing of prisoners' progress on treatment programs, their rehabilitation and reintegration needs, and their behaviour in prison.⁷⁷ However, the contact form checklist was too limited in scope to meaningfully contribute to prisoner welfare or preparedness for return to society.
- 6.7 The case conference facilitated good participation by prisoners, as required for enhanced case management. However, while the conference minutes conformed to the policy requirements, the engagement of prisoners was not being captured. There was a need to amend practice to ensure that details of prisoner participation (including of any prisoner advocate), concerns raised by the prisoner or advocate, and whether they consented to the proposed decision or management plan are recorded in case conference minutes.
- 6.8 The Department piloted a Reintegration Needs Assessment (IRiNA) tool at Bunbury and other facilities in 2010, as the basis for a more holistic and inclusive case management system. A fuller trial was provided in 2013 at the Greenough Women's Precinct, and West Kimberley Regional Prison which also piloted enhanced case management.⁷⁸ These holistic systems of Integrated Offender Management involve a multidisciplinary team approach to case management; involving education, employment, programs, and mental health staff, and enhanced processes for officers' case management of individual prisoners.⁷⁹
- 6.9 As part of an Integrated Offender Management system, Community Corrections Officers will also use the LS/RNR assessment for court reports.⁸⁰ If the offender receives a custodial sentence these assessments will then be available for use by prison-based assessment teams. This integrated approach should result in more streamlined management of offenders.

SUPPORTING LEGAL NEEDS INCLUDING PAROLE APPLICATIONS

- 6.10 Prisoners should have the right to access relevant and contemporary information relating to law that affects their situation. This right is particularly important for remandees, who may need information to assist them to understand their case and legal proceedings or to represent themselves. However, it is also important for sentenced prisoners, many of whom may have family law issues or concerns with the laws applicable to their sentence.

77 DCS, Adult Custodial Rule 18, Assessment and Sentence Management of Prisoners.

78 DCS, *Post Pilot Review: Greenough Regional Prison Integrated Offender Management Committee Report* (January 2014) 24; OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of West Kimberley and Broome Regional Prisons*, Report No. 96 (March 2015) 29–30.

79 The Department currently refers to Individualised Integrated Case Management, rather than Integrated Offender Management.

80 At the time of the inspection, the tool was in use in some Adult Community Corrections offices and in three prisons, including Bunbury.

- 6.11 The library at Bunbury contained Departmental policy directives and local prison orders. Other legal resources were provided in hard copy and on a library computer.
- 6.12 At the time of the inspection, the prison was working to enhance legal support and mediation processes, drawing on support from the Bunbury Community Legal Centre and Community Mediation Service. Commendably, planned services included community advice and education on civil law, and assistance in alternative dispute resolution. Legal aid were also planning to provide advice on criminal law.
- 6.13 The PSO, Employment Coordinator, and a peer support prisoner helped prisoners, including those with literacy problems, with parole applications.

PROGRAMS

Programs Framework, Staffing and Infrastructure

- 6.14 Offender treatment programs are intended to contribute to reducing the risk of recidivism. Programs that recognise diversity and special needs can encourage rehabilitation. The successful completion of programs has the potential to enable a reduction in security rating, to secure a placement closer to home, and influence the outcome of a prisoner's parole application.
- 6.15 While Bunbury specialised in programs for sex offenders it was an important site for program delivery generally. It was a strong performer in terms of the range and frequency of program delivery. However, as described below, ongoing and systemic issues included a failure to ensure that the right program was delivered to the right person at the right time; and to ensure robust evaluations of what works for whom and why.

Program Content, Suitability, Availability and Scheduling

- 6.16 Recognised treatment programs provided at Bunbury included: the Pathways substance abuse program; the Think First cognitive skills program; high and medium intensity Sex Offender Treatment programs (SOTP); the Sex Offender Deniers' program; and Stopping Family Violence programs (two were run in 2012). In 2014, Bunbury ran two Intensive Sex Offender programs, a Medium Sex Offender program and a Deniers' Sex Offender program.
- 6.17 These programs addressed the treatment needs of a large proportion of the prisoner population convicted of sex offences (92 at the time of writing). However, there were more violent offence prisoners (141) than sex offence prisoners. Despite the large number of violent offenders, Departmental assessments did not identify sufficient demand for violence-related treatment programs.⁸¹ Moreover, there was a consensus among custodial staff that the residential Violent Offender Treatment Program (VOTP) worsens the therapeutic environment for sex offenders, by creating a group more likely to bully and marginalise them.

81 On October 7 2014, 17 prisoners required a violent offender course. However, only five required an intensive VOTP, and the others required different course including medium intensity VOTP, family violence courses, and course tailored to Aboriginal offenders.

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- 6.18 The Think First cognitive skills program is valuable in itself for many offenders, and a stepping stone for more intensive programs. There was an unmet need among the existing prisoners at Bunbury for this program. There has been a reduction of delivery across West Australian prisons including Bunbury over the years, and many prisoners have missed out. Some prisoners were pointlessly scheduled for Think First after completing a more intense program which included a more comprehensive cognitive behavioural component. However, program facilitators often revised the status of prisoners' cognitive skills program requirements in such cases.
- 6.19 There was a strong need for Pathways, an intensive addictions program, among Bunbury's prisoners. The program was competently provided, with nine programs scheduled for 2014. However, clinicians lacked access to the Department's Total Offender Management System database to obtain information about the relationship between prisoners' offending and substance use, and about their prison behaviour. Such information would assist in evaluating prisoners' program progress; for example, if they were found to have tested positive for using a banned substance. There was also a need for course tailored to the needs of Aboriginal prisoners in particular (see Chapter 5).
- 6.20 Our inspection also found that delays and changes to the programs schedule were negatively impacting upon prisoners' commitments in industries and education, particularly where information was not being communicated in a timely fashion.
- 6.21 Prisoners expressed concern that parole applications could be held up or damaged by non-completion of programs. Gaps between program requirements, program availability and the time available to undertake programs before potential release on parole were problematic. Prisoners with relatively short sentences often had to do two or more programs, which was sometimes unachievable within the timeframe.
- 6.22 Prisoners sensibly suggested that they be allowed to complete programs in the community after release. This is relevant to all prisoners and especially to minimum-security prisoners in the PRU. Wandoo Reintegration Facility has been providing a good lead in this direction by facilitating prisoners' participation in voluntary programs in the community during s95 activities.⁸² Eastern Goldfields Regional Prison has also made arrangements for selected s95 prisoners to undertake programs run by community corrections, alongside offenders on community supervision orders.
- 6.23 The 'what works' approach to program provision emphasises the need to have the right person undertaking the right program.⁸³ Overtreatment – the placement of a lower risk offender in an intensive program – can be even more damaging to rehabilitation than not providing a program at all. Programs are limited in the extent to which they can accommodate individual needs, such as: low literacy, inability to reason, inability to function within a group, inability to communicate using English, and cultural barriers. Bunbury's clinicians expressed frustration that prisoners were too often booked for programs which represented overtreatment, or for which they were otherwise unsuitable. They noted that it was seldom possible to change the composition of the group.

82 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Wandoo Reintegration Facility*, Report No. 94 (November 2014) 39–40.
83 Cann J, Falshaw L, Nugent F & Friendship C, *Understanding what works: Accredited cognitive skills programmes for adult men and young offenders* (London Home Office Research Finding No. 226, 2003)

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- 6.24 Expectations by the Prisoners Review Board and the Supreme Court (in the case of Dangerous Sex Offenders) that the Department treat certain individuals meant they were often placed in group programs despite having issues that would ordinarily disqualify them. Two such prisoners were accommodated in a 2014 Intensive Sex Offender Treatment program by providing additional individual counselling. With programs staff facilitating programs on a part-time basis, there would seem to be an opportunity to extend individual counselling for participants with particular needs.
- 6.25 A limited range of voluntary programs were available at Bunbury, but few were supported and it was not clear that voluntary programs were sufficiently valued by the Department. The Chaplaincy facilitated several programs highly valued by prisoners. The self-help programs for alcohol, drug, or gambling addictions were well-attended. Chaplaincy also sponsored the Prison Fellowship's Sycamore Tree program which exposes violent offender to the experience of victims as a form of restorative justice. While such programs could be transformative, the Department and the Prisoners Review Board appear to place little weight on them as reducing a person's risk of reoffending.

Program Evaluation

- 6.26 Effectiveness of programs is gauged through processes of evaluation. The Department properly conceives of evaluation as comprising:
- program integrity (congruence with 'what works' principles);
 - short-term impact (change in recidivism risk); and
 - long-term effectiveness (program impact on recidivism rates).⁸⁴
- 6.27 The Clinical Governance Unit has worked with partners to conduct short-term impact evaluations on its sex offender programs and the Pathways program. Pre and post testing was undertaken for some of the programs up until the second half of 2013, but discontinued in 2014, as a cost-cutting measure. This was concerning, as such evaluations are required over time to check if the programs maintain or improve their impact, to check that delivery across sites is consistent, and to support program development and refinement.
- 6.28 The Department had also yet to commission research into the critical issue of the long-term effectiveness of programs in reducing reoffending. Longitudinal research is essential to the Department knowing whether programs expenditure represents value for money. It would also help ascertain the accuracy of psychometric tests used to measure the recidivism risk of program completers. The recent report on recidivism published by this Office showed that outcomes from programs cannot be taken for granted.⁸⁵

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND INDUSTRIES

Education and Training Management

- 6.29 Education focused on vocational education and training, coordinating traineeships for the prison's work areas. Industry standards were applied to work and training practices, and the Department's Education and Vocational Training Unit (EVTU) advised the prison in regards to the employment-relevance of training. Despite the education team's focus on

84 DCS, Inspection Documentation, *Offender programs response* (July 2014).

85 OICS, *Recidivism rates and the impact of treatment programs* (October 2014).

employment-relevant training, prison industries continued to have a primary focus on production. Prison and Departmental management recognised that the prison needed to provide more accredited training for prisoners, and that additional training needed to be provided to Vocational Support Officers (VSO) to achieve this.⁸⁶

- 6.30 Particular areas of education and training focus included literacy; computer skills; young Aboriginal prisoners (18–24 year old); and prisoners close to release (nine–12 month pre-release). Some short courses and individual coaching were provided for illiterate prisoners.
- 6.31 The Education Manager, Prison Employment Officer, and other education and training staff worked together to provide coordinated planning and support for prisoners' reintegration. This included linking education, training, and employment needs. This collaborative work provided a good basis for the prison's plans to develop formal reintegration planning processes in future.

Education and Training Staffing

- 6.32 The main Education Centre had good staffing levels. The education team consisted of a Campus Manager, three Prison Education Coordinators (PEC), an Education Clerk, and an Employment Coordinator. At the time of the inspection, one PEC was acting as Campus Manager. An EVTU Prisoner Education Manager provided strong guidance and support while the PEC was acting.⁸⁷ Two coordinators specialised in vocational training and coursework respectively.
- 6.33 Education was supported by several external providers which included: Polytechnic West, Halifax Skilled Training, Bridgeworks, Nara Training and Assessing, and Plenty Systems, and Trainwest. The major provider was the South-West Institute of Technology (SWIT). SWIT's provision of tutors had been reduced and this had stalled training for the first quarter of 2014.
- 6.34 The Prison Employment Officer worked closely with the education and training teams to plan and support integrated education, training, and work. The prison also had 22 Vocational Support Officers, providing certificate and informal training. Employment-focused education was supported at the Pre-Release Unit (PRU) by an Education Coordinator and several occasional tutors.

Education Centre Infrastructure

- 6.35 The main facility Education Centre was well-equipped. Adequate computers serviced a full-time study room. Education computers had up-to-date operating systems, software, and the local server was adequate. However, study opportunities were limited by the lack of prisoner computers, access to the internet and appropriate software in the accommodation units. This limitation contravened the Department's policy, which stated that the 'no prisoners in need of access to a computer for bona fide educational or legal purposes, is to be disadvantaged.'⁸⁸

86 DCS Bunbury, Superintendent's pre-inspection briefing, 3 November 2014; Bunbury Prison Industry Training Audit, 14 October 2014.

87 EVTU manages the Department's education and training services for prisoners and juvenile detainees.

88 DCS, Policy Directive 2 – Use of Computers by Prisoners, 5.2, approved 25 June 2010.

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- 6.36 Some prison systems in other states and internationally provide computers in prisoner cells (sometimes with restricted internet access), recognising that computer literacy is integral to education delivery and a basic necessity for everyday life post-release. Where computers were being provided in Australia, they supported education and training and access to legal documents. Victoria and the ACT allowed computers in cells in some prisons. The Northern Territory and New South Wales were considering prisoner computers.⁸⁹
- 6.37 Internationally, best practice for prisoner computers occurred in Norway, where good access corresponded to low recidivism rates.⁹⁰ Commenting on the situation in the UK, the Chief Inspector of Prisons stated, '[w]e can't go on with prisons in a pre-internet dark age: inefficient, wasteful and leaving prisoners woefully unprepared for the real world they will face on release'.⁹¹ While there are security issues to be managed in the use of computers and the internet, this view is equally relevant for Bunbury and other Western Australian prisons. The Department should, therefore, progress the development of prisoners access to computers and the internet.

Education Planning, Access and Provision

- 6.38 At the main prison, assessment for prisoners' education and training included standards of literacy and numeracy, aims, goals and career aspirations. At the PRU, staff focused on supporting career pathways. The IMP accompanying prisoners transferring from another prison enabled Bunbury's educators to make recommendations designed to facilitate continuance.
- 6.39 During the first six months of 2014, on average 22.2 per cent of the prison population was actively enrolled in accredited educational programs. During the same period 92 indigenous prisoners were enrolled in accredited courses – this represented 23.1 per cent of the Aboriginal population, meaning Aboriginal prisoner participation matched the level of non-Aboriginal participation in education.
- 6.40 The number of full-time students in education had fallen from 40 in 2012/13 to six in 2013/14, partly as a consequence of education funding having been limited to certificate courses only. There were also only five prisoners engaged in tertiary studies in the first six months of 2014. However, the education team and work area managers cooperated well to enable prisoner to combine part-time study with work, and there were 12 part-time students at the time of the writing.
- 6.41 Recent changes to statewide and national vocational education and training standards had limited the amount of SWIT-provided training. Consequently, Bunbury had only delivered half of its available education hours for 2014 by early November. While Bunbury was progressing through the shortfall, the risk remained that if sufficient contract hours were not delivered before the end of the year, the annual allocation of hours could be cut for 2015.
- 6.42 Despite the reduced supply of tutors, SWIT had increased its provision of Cert II training (from 32 prisoners and 98 completions in 2013, to 93 students with 259 completions in 2014). This included an increase in Cert. II horticulture in particular (from nine students and 24 completions in 2013 to 42 students and 91 completions in 2014). This was, in part,

89 <Governmentnews.com.au>, 'Digitised cells a future lock-in for prisons', 7 August 2014.

90 Ibid.

91 Prison Reform Trust, *ibid.*, foreword, 2012.

the result of having a particularly good SWIT trainer working with prisoners in the market gardens and main facility grounds.

- 6.43 There had been a 35 per cent increase in students undertaking training provided by the Department's own Registered Training Organisation, Auswest Specialist Education and Training Services (ASETS), primarily through high numbers doing the Safety Signs and Information component of Cert I in General Education. However, there were decreases in Cert. II and III students, with Cert. II dropping from 11 students and 64 completions in 2013 to 10 students and just 10 completions in 2014, and Cert. III dropping from two students and 34 completions in 2013, to no students in 2014.

Training in the Industries and Other Work Areas

- 6.44 Education and employment staff cooperated well to provide individual plans and support for prisoner's education, training, and employment needs. This included support for prisoners who would be recognised as special needs students in the community. Commendably the approach was culturally and socially appropriate, involving non-shaming engagement with prisoners who had difficulties engaging with constructive activities.
- 6.45 Bunbury provided traineeships and some apprenticeships. There was scope for more post-release employment-relevant training, particularly in some of the industry areas. Work areas providing training included vegetable preparation, cabinet shop, and the laundry. All work areas required external training supervision to some degree, as Bunbury did not have qualified VSOs to sign off on all accredited courses completed by prisoners. Some work areas, including metal shop, grounds, and market gardens were even more reliant on external trainers as the VSOs managing the work were not qualified for training.



Photo 8 : Trailers made in the Skills workshop. This is a very productive workshop with up to 180 trailers being made in any one month.

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- 6.46 The ability of VSOs to provide training is essential to supporting prisoners to develop work-relevant skills and qualifications. Ideally, VSOs should therefore meet the Australian Quality Training Framework (AQTF) requirements for RTO vocational trainers. The AQTF requires trainers to have the Certificate IV Training and Assessment qualification, or equivalent competencies. After 1 January 2016, they will be required to have the Training and Assessment Certificate, or a qualification in adult education at diploma level or higher, in addition to undertaking regular professional development.⁹² This is likely to require greater resourcing if Bunbury and other WA prisons are to maintain and increase the provision of training ‘in-house’.
- 6.47 Bunbury had made some progress in this regard, as nearly half of the VSOs had Certificate IV in Training and Assessment, or equivalent competencies. As most work areas had at least one VSO with the AQTF requirements, the prison had the potential to deliver a broad range of prisoner training on-site, while needing to extend the Cert IV in Training and Assessment to more staff.
- 6.48 The prison was also providing short course training to VSOs to augment their ability to train prisoners, and several VSOs already had a strong range of relevant skills. Short course training for medium-security prisoners, included traffic management and forklift courses in the main facility. While the short courses provided were valuable because they targeted skills needed in the West Australian employment market, they could also be accredited as part of certificated training (for example, in Construction or Agrifood Operations).
- 6.49 The vegetable preparation workshop excelled in prisoner training, and the VSO had won a state award and a Superintendent’s award for training since the 2011 inspection. The workshop provided food preparation, hospitality, asset maintenance and Food Stars basic food handling and hygiene training. This workshop delivered literacy and numeracy progress for prisoners. At the time of the inspection the VSO was providing 20 traineeships including Certificate II and III in food processing. Training opportunities in the cabinet shop and laundry were also good, with apprenticeships in the cabinet shop.
- 6.50 The skills workshop and the metal shop were intended to provide a training and work pathway, with prisoners progressing from basic training and work in the skills workshop to the more advanced training and work in the metal shop. This pathway had not been successful, however, because it lacked a qualified trainer. In future, qualified VSOs should be able to do much of the certificated training and assessment.
- 6.51 At the time of the inspection no access to training was being provided in the market gardens. Supervision was stretched because the second market gardens VSO was frequently redeployed when both market gardens VSOs were on duty. Neither the grounds nor maintenance areas were providing training. The prison expected to fill a vacant construction VSO position shortly after the inspection and this should enable training in this area. The kitchen (which was separate from the vegetable preparation workshop) was limited in training, providing just Food Stars I-II. Two new cook instructors were due to start in late 2014. This may enable more training. The canteen and stores were not providing training. One of the Stores VSOs had Cert IV Training and

92 Australian Skills Quality Authority, *User’s Guide to the Standards for Registered Training Organisations 2015*.

assessment, and could therefore deliver training in stores in future. The Department was negotiating with an external provider for provision of warehouse training. As noted in Chapter 5, training was not being provided through recreation.

Recommendation 12

Ensure that Vocational Support Officers focus on their core responsibilities by ceasing to deploy them into custodial roles.

- 6.52 In addition to the issues of VSO qualifications and professional development, and VSO redeployment, prisoner training reportedly suffered from continuity issues. VSOs reported that courses were being provided inconsistently between prisons, so that a prisoner transferred from Bunbury to another prison may not be able to continue his course. Similarly, prisoners were unable to continue courses they had started in prison with community education providers after release. There was therefore scope for the Department and community education providers to cooperate towards greater continuity.

Aboriginal Prisoners Education and Training

- 6.53 The 2009 inspection recommended ‘that the prison develop and implement a cultural learning program for Noongar prisoners.’⁹³ Accordingly, a part-time Aboriginal tutor delivered Indigenous History and the ‘Keep your Culture, Keep your Job’ course from 2011 till 2013. Since then education has not had an Aboriginal staff member. However, the prison was preparing to advertise for an Aboriginal Education Worker at the time of the inspection.
- 6.54 Training in grounds, market gardens, section 95 and vegetable preparation was provided with the post-release employment pathways of Aboriginal prisoners in mind. Support for Aboriginal men had produced some notable successes, including involvement in higher level training in laundry, metals and engineering. In consultation with Bunbury’s Aboriginal Reference Group, the prison was also developing plans to focus on young (18–24 year old) Aboriginal prisoners and those who are nine–12 months pre-release. They planned to use the vocational skills workshop, focusing on hands-on skills, basic literacy and numeracy, traffic management, business, assets and hospitality training, and arts and music.

Future Planning for Reintegration Focused Work and Training

- 6.55 Rehabilitation, including reintegration, is one of the key elements of the Department’s mission statement. At Bunbury, the Superintendent reported the prison was planning to develop a strategic reintegration services plan, beginning by mapping the prisoner population needs. The prison was planning to develop integrated services including education, industries, employment coordination and transitional services. Within this, Bunbury intended to include a focus on medium-security prisoners (who lack the re-entry services support available to minimum-security prisoners), and Aboriginal prisoners.

93 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 59 (February 2009) vii.

- 6.56 This Office supports Bunbury’s initiatives in principle as a way to improve re-entry support and reduce recidivism. They would fit well within the Department’s developing Integrated Offender Management Model, and correspond to some of the best practices for reintegration planning at prisons such as Wandoo Reintegration Facility, and Pardelup Prison Farm (see Chapter 7).

Recommendation 13

Bunbury to develop and implement a reintegration services plan with targets and performance measures.

Chapter 7

THE PRE-RELEASE UNIT

- 7.1 This chapter examines the re-entry work of Bunbury's Pre-Release Unit (PRU). The design of the PRU was intended to provide the best support for preparing prisoners for reintegration into society, encouraging prisoners to become self-responsible through participation in a constructive environment that mirrors life in the community as far as possible and facilitates participation in community activities including work, training, recreation, and short stays with family (reintegration leave).
- 7.2 The PRU is a stand-alone facility sharing some services and resources with the main prison. The PRU has its own administration facility, control room, visits centre, workshop, library, canteen/supermarket, gardens and recreation equipment. In design and capacity it is equivalent to the Boronia Pre-release Centre but, unlike Boronia does not have its own management team or staff. Bunbury's Superintendent is responsible for the PRU, with the PRU managed by an Assistant Superintendent (the PRU Manager). The PRU programs, medical, recreation and prison support services were provided by staff working in these areas in the main prison. Education, programs and medical services were delivered from satellite offices located in the PRU, with education services managed by the PRU Education Coordinator.



Photo 9 : The PRU environment.

MANAGEMENT OF THE PRU

- 7.3 The PRU Manager worked in consultation with a multidisciplinary team. Regular stakeholders' meetings included the Superintendent, PRU Manager, programs staff, transitional management, canteen and life skills, and Vocational Support Officer (VSO) staff. However, unlike re-entry facilities such as Pardelup, and Wandoo, Bunbury did not operate with a transitional management or reintegration checklist process linked to cross-department support.⁹⁴
- 7.4 At Wandoo, this took the form of planning in key 'pathways' areas considered necessary for progress towards successful reintegration.⁹⁵ Commendably, at Wandoo, the prisoner was involved in his own reintegration planning, and thus supported to develop self-responsibility. Moreover, the planning process at Wandoo began during orientation, thereby maximising the time available to plan and implement actions. Examples such as this should assist Bunbury to implement its plans for a more coordinated approach to reintegration and individual offender management (see Chapter 6).
- 7.5 Re-entry services staff strongly praised the PRU Manager for providing leadership for the facility's reintegration and re-entry support roles, and for being team-focused and empowering. One staff member said that the PRU had been more progressive under his leadership. For example they had increased prisoners' constructive engagement by opening the gym for use throughout the day, instead of restricting it to non-work times.
- 7.6 However, many staff were ambivalent to, or sceptical of the PRU. This appeared to reflect a tension between custodial practices at the main prison and the PRU's encouragement of trust, self-responsibility and constructive engagement for prisoners. For example, there was some staff resistance to escorting prisoners convicted of sex offences on external activities, despite the Department's careful risk assessment procedures. There were also tensions surrounding the drive to enhance training opportunities for PRU prisoners. Combined with a more general uncertainty at the prison over the extent to which its industries should focus on training or on production, this had negatively affected pre-release and reintegration services.
- 7.7 In addition, unlike other re-entry facilities such as Boronia, Pardelup and Wandoo, the PRU did not have its own staffing. This meant that prison officers from the main prison, which has a very different culture and focus, were staffing the PRU. It had also not been possible to ensure adequate staffing for the section 95 external activities.
- 7.8 The Department has revamped its management of re-entry services under the guidance of an Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services. The Assistant Commissioner is responsible for minimum-security prisons, industries, and work camps, and for managing the provision of opportunities for prisoners to 'improve their work skills, maintain family links and prepare for reintegration and release'. Unfortunately, Bunbury's PRU did not fall within his remit and tended to function as an adjunct to the main prison.

94 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Pardelup Prison Farm*, Report No. 82 (December 2012); OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Wandoo Reintegration Facility*, Report No. 94 (November 2014). Pardelup used a Pre-Release Transition Checklist, and Wandoo used the Wandoo Reintegration Plan.

95 These included family and significant others; health and wellbeing; substance misuse; accommodation; employment; education and vocational training; cultural and spiritual needs; financial and legal issues.

- 7.9 This Office was unable to discover any sensible reason for this exclusion, which is at odds with the PRU's title, role, facility design, activities and prisoner cohort. The PRU could be given greater clarity and support if, like equivalent facilities, it was brought within the responsibility of the Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services.
- 7.10 The lack of Departmental oversight did not help Bunbury resolve conflicts among some of its management team over how to achieve the right balance between reintegration activities (including work and training), and reparative activities (including industrial production and market gardening). These longstanding tensions had also led to a less than harmonious environment between prison management and the VSO teams. Shortly before the inspection, the Superintendent had brought an external mediator in to help resolve the conflict but it was too early to form a view on its success.

Recommendation 14

Bring the Bunbury Pre-Release Unit within the remit of the Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services.⁹⁶

- 7.11 The PRU is a re-entry facility, akin to Pardelup Prison (which is a working farm with full employment for prisoners who have completed their training), Wandoo Reintegration Facility (which prepares 18–24 year old men for release), and Boronia Pre-Release Centre for Women (a metropolitan facility providing re-entry support for women). Yet, unlike these facilities, the PRU lacked sufficient autonomy over its own strategic philosophy and management, operational procedures, staffing, and resourcing. All of the other comparable facilities had their own Superintendent, staffing and resourcing.
- 7.12 Staffing and resources in many service areas were stretched across the two facilities including education, training, section 95 and external recreation, as well as transitional management, and prison and post-release employment support. Education and management staff at the PRU reported the need for more resources (including education staff) to provide more re-entry relevant training. VSO redeployment to other industries or gardens areas hampered the s95 activities. The lack of sufficient recreation officers hampered the PRU's ability to support external recreation, as the recreation officer was needed to support recreation in the main facility. Each of these areas is vital to providing adequate re-entry support.
- 7.13 Despite the competent administration team responsible for managing Bunbury's dual facilities, there was an over-burdening of the prison's administration team with responsibilities spanning both facilities (see Chapter 2), which hampered the team's ability to proactively manage the main facility and its services. Correspondingly, there was a lack of sufficiently clear direction and support for re-entry at Bunbury.
- 7.14 Although the PRU and the main facility productively share resources and cooperate in many ways, it may be advisable to review the facilities, roles, operations, and resources dedicated to re-entry services at Bunbury, and consider whether they would function better as independent facilities.

96 Since the time of writing this report, the position of Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services has been removed from the DCS management structure and its responsibilities and functions absorbed into other management streams.

Recommendation 15

Establish the Pre-Release Unit as a stand-alone facility with its own management, staffing, budget, and performance measures.

PRU CUSTODIAL STAFFING

- 7.15 Custodial staff who worked in the PRU did so on a roster system, rotating between duties in the main prison and the PRU.⁹⁷ Some staff familiar with the higher security regimes in the main facility found it difficult to adjust to the more trust-based staff-prisoner engagement of the PRU. Consequently, this Office heard complaints of inconsistency and of some officers not embracing the re-entry focus of the PRU. Despite the provision of an orientation guide for officers working in the PRU, this problem has been an ongoing issue and in 2011 this Office recommended that Bunbury should ‘develop a specific roster for the PRU with dedicated PRU officers and provide appropriate training in the role and operations of a pre-release facility to all officers who will work in the PRU.’⁹⁸
- 7.16 In early 2014 the prison began consideration of a revised staffing model for the PRU. The consultations on this model need to be progressed in a timely fashion. At a minimum, a three-to-six month roster would ensure greater consistency and a higher quality of custodial management in line with the facility’s re-entry and self-responsibility philosophies. This Office therefore reiterates the point made in its previous recommendation.⁹⁹

Recommendation 16

For as long as the Pre-Release Unit remains an adjunct of the main Bunbury facility, staff it with a dedicated roster, achieved through expression of interest.

- 7.17 VSO staffing for the section 95 prisoner work in the community typically worked on a ratio of one officer to one team of approximately eight prisoners. In 2011 the PRU had three officers and the ability to take out three teams (approximately 24 prisoners). This was a good performance providing a good proportion of PRU prisoners with external activities.
- 7.18 However, the VSO section 95 staffing was reduced from three officers to two in 2012, before being reduced to just one officer for most up the period up until November 2014. At the time of the inspection the prison had hired an acting VSO for section 95 duties on a three month contract, temporarily bringing the section 95 team back to two officers. This belated improvement does not compensate for the fact that section 95 activities had been poorly staffed for most of the period since the previous inspection, and that prisoner participation rates were low (see below).

97 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) 56.

98 Ibid., Recommendation 20.

99 OICS, *Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison*, Report No. 75 (December 2011) Recommendation 20.

- 7.19 Staff redeployment to other duties negatively affected the PRU. Non-custodial staff considered non-essential to core prison duties were being redeployed to custodial duties because of a shortfall in custodial staff. The prison preferred to redeploy 'non-essential' staff, rather than use custodial staff on overtime, in order to manage its overtime costs. However, VSO staff should not be considered to be performing non-essential roles, particularly in a prison designed to support prisoner reintegration as one of its major roles. For prisoners, redeployment sometimes meant further restrictions to section 95 external activities and other reintegration activities.

Recommendation 17

Ensure that section 95 staffing levels are consistently sufficient for the number of prisoners eligible for external activities.

ALIGNING THE PRU POPULATION WITH THE RE-ENTRY ROLE

- 7.20 The PRU opened in November 2008 with a design capacity of 72 prisoners, accommodated in 12 houses comprising six single occupancy rooms. Ideally, the PRU will house prisoners in the last 12 months of their sentence, given its focus on pre-release support.
- 7.21 Crowding refers to an inadequacy of staffing, services and facilities in proportion to the number of prisoners held at a facility. For most of the time from 2008 to 2014, the PRU had been crowded, operating with an upper limit of 108, and with three (of six) rooms in each house being doubled-up. Re-entry resources were not increased to match this high population and the PRU design and role was compromised.
- 7.22 The PRU had also been compromised by the fact that it had been holding too many minimum-security prisoners who still had long periods left to serve and were therefore not suitable for 're-entry' programs.
- 7.23 However, in April 2014, following the Superintendent's request, the Department approved a staged reduction to 72 prisoners. From 2015 onwards, the prison also planned to only use the PRU for minimum-security prisoners who had completed their programs. This will allow it to concentrate on re-entry preparation, including training, employment, and transitional needs (including documentation, banking, life skills and accommodation).

PRE-RELEASE SERVICES

Employment and Training

- 7.24 The Employment Coordinator managed the Prisoner Employment Program (PEP), and facilitated other employment-relevant training and activities. PEP allows 'minimum-security prisoners to have the opportunity to engage in meaningful and sustainable paid employment, work experience, vocational training and education in the community prior to their release'.¹⁰⁰

100 DCS, *Prisoner Employment Program ... Building a Future: The First Six Months September 2008 to March 2009* (2009).

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- 7.25 Reintegration support for prisoners nearing release was supported on a collaborative basis, with the coordinator working with the PRU Manager and the Transitional Manager. Prisoners received support for post-release employment preparation prior to release and follow-up support for six months after release. Employment support included the following services:
- career and employment services to prisoners, including employment exhibitions;
 - application and placements for Fairbridge Bindjareb (BIS Industries);¹⁰¹
 - truck drivers licences and high-risk cards;¹⁰²
 - liaison with external employment bodies and agencies; and
 - short course vocational training through section 95.
- 7.26 The PRU Education Centre provided a variety of employment-relevant short courses. These included traffic management, working at heights, and – for those with section 95 approval – forklift, excavator, bobcat and front-end loader operations. The PRU Education Centre only had one full-time staff member (the Education Coordinator), and would benefit from better staffing. PRU education staff also suggested that the PRU could provide more short course training for prisoners, as well as improved support for IT literacy. Positively, the Department has committed to overcoming interruptions to training caused by prisoners progressing from the main facility to the PRU, and to ensuring that training that prisoners commence in the main facility can be continued at the PRU.¹⁰³

Section 95 Activities

- 7.27 Section 95 external work provides an important element of the reintegration supported by the PRU, enabling prisoners to constructively engage in the local community, and gain valuable employment and training experience. As noted above, VSO staffing problems limited prisoners' access to this reintegration activity, and thus hampered prisoners' preparation for successful re-entry into society. In 2014 section 95 external work teams averaged only seven prisoners, a fall from up to 24 team members in 2012 (when the PRU had three s95 officers).
- 7.28 The Department's tightening of eligibility assessments for section 95 work in 2014 also had an adverse effect on the number of prisoners able to engage in external activities.¹⁰⁴ Under Assistant Commissioner Custodial Operations notice 8/2014 prisons were required to seek the approval of Corrective Services Intelligence Directorate, the Designated Superintendent, and the Director of Sentence Management before a prisoner could be approved for section 95. This process caused delays in the progression of minimum-security prisoners to section 95 external activities.

101 BIS industries focus on increasing indigenous employment. Operating at Fairbridge, BIS provides prisoners with Cert II in Surface Extraction Operations (RII20209). Successful completion of the course leads to guaranteed employment with BIS industries. See BIS, *Indigenous Development Strategy 2013*.

102 The National Standard for Licensing Persons Performing High Risk Work requires workers in dogging, rigging, scaffolding, forklift, cranes, and pressure vehicles to hold a high-risk card to ensure OS&H standards.

103 DCS, *Bunbury Regional Prison 2013-14 Business Case*, 17.

104 Following the escape of a prisoner undertaking external section 95 activities from Wooroloo Prison Farm, the Department tightened assessment procedures for external activity access.

- 7.29 In addition, as discussed, section 95 eligibility at the PRU had been restricted due to the number of minimum-security prisoners who had outstanding treatment needs, and were therefore ineligible for external activities.
- 7.30 Despite the small size of the section 95 teams, the PRU provided useful work for government departments and not-for-profit organisations in the local region. The team worked in Bunbury, Busselton, Bridgetown, Collie, Busselton, Australind, and Harvey. Throughout 2014, Bunbury City Council was using one section 95 work team per week. Commendably, the council had a section 95 prisoner working in the council maintenance yard two days a week, and one former PEP prisoner had continued working with the council following his release, on a 12-month traineeship.
- 7.31 Bunbury City Council aimed to give section 95 prisoners meaningful work. Labour for the council included gardening, maintenance, fencing, clearing and limestone block work. Prisoners worked on the city foreshore walkways, gaining work-relevant skills. Section 95 bridge building work in Bunbury was combined with Certificate I training in construction.
- 7.32 Prisoners were becoming increasingly recognised in the community for their work contribution. Community work included: assistance to south-west senior citizens, building gazebos for the palliative care section of Bunbury hospital, and maintenance of church grounds. The section 95 team also helped with the clean-up after the 2013 Margaret River fires, doing clearing, fencing, and decking. PRU labour saved Bunbury City Council an estimated \$250,000 to \$300,000 in 2013/14.¹⁰⁵
- 7.33 The PRU had between one and three PRU prisoners working at the community Food Bank centre in 2014. Prisoners had warehouse duties and helped with the breakfast program. The Foodbank Manager said the community service relied on the section 95 workers. This engagement led to some good outcomes: one prisoner had continued to do voluntary service, while another prisoner had gained a storeperson position following release.
- 7.34 Some PRU prisoners worked in the prison's market gardens and in ground and maintenance teams. The market gardens are external to the PRU and provided work for up to 17 prisoners supervised by two VSOs. The grounds and maintenance team consists of up to 18 prisoners working in the prison's external gardens and facilities, as well as inside the PRU. One VSO supervised the team working externally of the PRU. On average, 30 prisoners were involved in these activities throughout 2012 to 2014. This work was linked to employment-relevant training in horticulture.

Supporting Life Skills and Wellbeing

- 7.35 The PRU canteen/supermarket and life skills services provided good re-entry preparation for prisoners, including practice based learning in the areas of menu planning, healthy cooking, household budgeting, modern shopping, cleaning and hygiene.
- 7.36 Life skills support starts with the PRU orientation process, where the Life Skills Officer provides diet planning for prisoners. The officer works with the cooks and cleaners for the houses, providing guidance on cooking, hygiene, and budgeting. All house residents received cooking lessons and advice for healthy eating. The officer also provided the Food Stars basic food handling and hygiene training.

¹⁰⁵ Estimate provided by Bunbury City Council.

- 7.37 The PRU catered for special diets, including vegetarians and Muslims. The Life Skills Officer supported residents to make their own agreements in the houses, negotiating between mainstream and special diet needs.¹⁰⁶ TAFE tutors provided OS&H and hygiene courses for all house residents.
- 7.38 The canteen/supermarket system complemented the house-based life skills support. The canteen/supermarket provided for individual item shopping (canteen ‘spends’) and household supermarket shopping. It supplied a diverse range of foods and cleaning products and regularly updated supplies to be responsive to prisoner requests and adapt to changing community practices. Regular town spends also catered effectively for prisoner requests.
- 7.39 The PRU ‘traffic light’ system for house budget and healthy food was commended in the previous inspection. Within this system prisoners have to spend a certain amount on each coded section (i.e. fruit, vegetables, red meat, white meat), to ensure an appropriate range of foods. This continued to work well and all dietary needs were being met.
- 7.40 The canteen/supermarket had been provided with a cargo container for extra storage. However, there was still a need for more freezer space.

Recreation in the PRU and Community

- 7.41 Involvement in recreation activities can help prepare prisoners for constructive and healthy engagement in the community. The PRU had a well equipped but small gym, a second shaded gym equipment area, a library with a pool table, and darts in the houses. Prisoners had good access to the gym. The isometric equipment throughout the facility was well used. Older prisoners had passive recreation options such as PlayStation or X-Box, carpet bowls and bingo.



Photo 10 : The gym in the PRU.

106 Special diets such as gluten free diets had individual budgets.

- 7.42 External recreation activities are an important component of preparing prisoners for release, allowing them to spend time with community members in an organised social setting. However, the PRU prisoners had not had regular external sporting opportunities. This compared poorly to other re-entry and minimum-security facilities such as Wooroloo Prison Farm and Pardelup Prison Farm.

PREPARING FOR RELEASE AND REINTEGRATION

- 7.43 The PRU Manager, Employment Coordinator, and the Transitional Manager were the prison-based team responsible for supporting prisoners' preparation for release and reintegration. The Transitional Manager and Accordwest (the community re-entry service provider) supported prisoners for six months prior to release, and Accordwest provided up to 12-months re-entry support after release. The service provider also supported families whose relatives had been incarcerated, for example by providing food vouchers and in-kind and emergency support.
- 7.44 Although Accordwest provided a good service their contract was too narrow: supporting prisoners for only six months before release was not giving enough time to help prepare them for re-entry in areas such as housing. Service providers informed the inspection team that few of the prisoners who wanted housing support received it, and earlier planning and preparation were needed. Unfortunately, such failings contributed to some negative prisoner perceptions of, and consequent disengagement with, re-entry support.
- 7.45 The Transitional Manager supported prisoners in renewing and obtaining drivers licences, and the documentation necessary for daily life including birth and marriage certificates, proof of identity cards, and Medicare cards. The manager arranged access to Centrelink for benefits support, liaised with prisoners' banks, and assisted with prisoners paying off fines. She also liaised with child support services, facilitated access to family counselling (through Relationships Australia), occasionally facilitated family dispute resolution interviews and mediation, and facilitated parenting courses.
- 7.46 External reintegration leave is designed to progress reintegration into society for prisoners nearing their release date, allowing them to spend time with family in their home settings. To be eligible, prisoners must be rated as minimum-security and have an effective sentence of at least 12 months. Other eligibility factors include prison conduct, program completion, sponsor suitability, and a risk assessment of the nature of the prisoner's offence and previous record of compliance. This program was competently managed by the PRU Manager, with the assistance of PRU officers.

Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS: BUNBURY 2014 – SOLID FOUNDATIONS AT BUNBURY'S DUAL FACILITIES

- 8.1 This inspection found that Bunbury was a well-performing prison where competent local management and staff teams were providing a generally safe, therapeutic, and productive environment.
- 8.2 The prison excelled in staff-prisoner relations, and there were good mechanisms ensuring that prisoners were able to have a voice in regards to operations, services, and conditions at Bunbury. The security team performed well despite facing significant infrastructure issues.
- 8.3 The prison had a committed and competent health team, and the peer support system and guidance for Aboriginal prisoners were strengths based, in part, on the strong experience of the PSO and the Aboriginal Visitor Service visitors. Program provision, one of the prison's key services, continued to be well-provided, as were counselling services. Bunbury's chaplains also continued to provide highly valued spiritual support, mentoring, and voluntary programs.
- 8.4 Bunbury had a competent management team who demonstrated good strategic planning in resource-limited conditions. Prison management were developing innovative strategies for hierarchical management and progressing future plans for improved substantive quality for Aboriginal prisoners.
- 8.5 Industries and gardens were highly productive, and the prison's finances were very well managed. Some areas of industries excelled in the provision of employment-relevant training. A dedicated re-entry manager and team cooperated well with the re-entry services provider (Accordwest) to support prisoners' education and training, employment, life skills and transitional needs.
- 8.6 Despite these strengths and achievements, Bunbury was however, hampered by:
- inhumane conditions in some of the prisoner accommodation, coupled with an inability to properly manage different groups;
 - inadequate strategies for reducing prisoners' access to and use of illicit substances;
 - a need to improve substantive equality for Aboriginal prisoners (despite some good practices);
 - a lack of resocialisation opportunities for long sentence prisoners;
 - some issues with respect to staff culture and morale;
 - an understaffed prison management team; and
 - a need for greater Departmental strategic direction and support for the Pre-Release Unit (PRU), reintegration services, and Integrated Offender Management.

ACCOMMODATION INFRASTRUCTURE

- 8.7 Unit 1 at Bunbury is out dated, fails to meet international standards for prisoner accommodation, and hampers the safe and efficient management of its remandees and prisoners. This Office recommended that the Department should replace Unit 1 with appropriate, contemporary accommodation that meets Australian and New Zealand standards for prisoners' accommodation, and securely meets the key needs of prisoners held there (Recommendation 6).

CONCLUSIONS: BUNBURY 2014 – SOLID FOUNDATIONS AT BUNBURY'S
DUAL FACILITIES

- 8.8 The cells in Unit 2 were also not fit for sharing: their size does not meet international, or Australian and New Zealand standards for accommodating more than one prisoner.

SECURITY

- 8.9 The perimeter fence was adequate to hamper or prevent escape, however there were a number of issues that hampered its effectiveness in preventing contraband entering the prison. This has made it difficult to prevent drug use among the prisoner population.
- 8.10 This report has also suggested that the Department recognise that supply prevention policies for managing trafficking and drug abuse have not proven successful to date, and greater investment should be made in demand reduction and harm minimisation strategies.
- 8.11 Bunbury's gatehouse and control room from suffered from infrastructure and staffing problems. This Office therefore recommended that the Department should improve the infrastructure and procedures for the gatehouse, control room and sally port (Recommendations 7 and 8).

ABORIGINAL PRISONERS

- 8.12 Bunbury prison demonstrated a strong focus on progressing Aboriginal prisoners towards positive reintegration outcomes. It was undertaking a consultative hierarchical management review, and had future plans for enhanced post-employment-relevant training. In order to support improved outcomes, this report has suggested that the Department revise its Bunbury KPIs to require greater Aboriginal participation in external work and vocational training.
- 8.13 The progression of Aboriginal prisoners to minimum-security, and therefore to PRU re-entry support, has been hampered by the Department's modified assessment tool, introduced in 2009. This issue has been known for some time but has not been actioned. It needs urgent reappraisal (see [5.6]–[5.8]).

LONG SENTENCE AND INDEFINITE SENTENCE PRISONERS

- 8.14 Long sentence and indefinite sentence prisoners subject to the *Offenders Community Corrections Act 1963* at Bunbury and elsewhere have been unable to access adequate reintegration assistance for too long. This is unjust for those prisoners and also compromises the Prisoners Review Board's ability to meet its obligations. A legislative or administrative solution is required (Recommendation 11).

MANAGEMENT AND STAFF

- 8.15 Bunbury was generally functioning well but needed greater strategic focus and support for its multiple roles. Correspondingly, Departmental management needed to build greater engagement with custodial staff, who had lost faith in head office leadership.
- 8.16 The prison's senior management team had performed competently, but were understaffed (primarily through the lack of an ASOS), and overburdened (in having responsibility for two distinct facilities).

CONCLUSIONS: BUNBURY 2014 – SOLID FOUNDATIONS AT BUNBURY'S
DUAL FACILITIES

- 8.17 A conflicted and sometimes negative staff culture had developed. This was distracting and draining.
- 8.18 Relevant recommendations relating to management and staff include:
- adequate relief coverage (Recommendation 1);
 - stronger head office strategic support and direction (Recommendation 2);
 - improved Senior Officer leadership training across the system and Senior Officer team meetings at Bunbury (Recommendations 3 and 4); and
 - dedicated staffing to support OS&H management (Recommendation 5).

HEALTH

- 8.19 This Office was disappointed to witness the lack of Aboriginal Health staff member at Bunbury, and recommended that the Health Directorate should recruit an Aboriginal Health Worker (Recommendation 10).
- 8.20 Bunbury prisoners suffered unacceptable delays in dental treatment. This is a systemic issue to which this Office repeatedly draws attention.

IT LITERACY

- 8.21 Bunbury, and all prisons in the state, should innovatively expand the use of Skype or other online technologies to facilitate family and community contact, official appointments, coverage of significant occasions and connection with communities.
- 8.22 Study opportunities at Bunbury were limited by the lack of prisoner computers, controlled internet access and appropriate software. While there are security issues to be managed, the Department should progress the development of prisoners' access to computers and the internet.

RECREATION

- 8.23 Recreation was hampered by a lack of rostered staff, and prisoners lacked training and external activity options. This report recommends that the prison should increase the range and frequency of recreational opportunities, including external activities from the Pre-Release Unit, and opportunities to obtain qualifications (Recommendation 9).

THE PRU, REINTEGRATION AND OFFENDER MANAGEMENT

- 8.24 Commendably, the PRU had been reduced from 108 to 72 prisoners, enabling it to return to its original design purpose of supporting minimum-security prisoners for successful re-entry into society through work, training, community and life skills support.
- 8.25 However, the management of the PRU had been hampered by a lack of sufficient strategic management, autonomy, and resourcing (including staffing). This Office therefore recommended that:
- the Department should establish the PRU as a stand-alone facility with its own management, staffing and budget, as with comparable re-entry facilities such as Pardelup Prison Farm, Wandoo Reintegration Facility, and Boronia Pre-Release Centre for Women (Recommendation 15);

CONCLUSIONS: BUNBURY 2014 – SOLID FOUNDATIONS AT BUNBURY'S
DUAL FACILITIES

- the PRU should be bought within the remit of the Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services(Recommendation 14);
 - the PRU should be staffed through a dedicated roster, achieved through expression of interest (Recommendation 16); and
 - the Department should ensure that section 95 staffing levels are consistently sufficient for the number of prisoners eligible for external activities (Recommendation 17).
- 8.26 There was also a need to enhance re-entry services for medium-security prisoners, and to better support reintegration through more employment-relevant training in industries. This report recommends that the Department cease the redeployment of VSOs to custodial roles (Recommendation 12).
- 8.27 The prison already undertakes significant reintegration activities but there is considerable potential to build up these services and to link them with the Department's focus on Individualised and Integrated Offender Management. To that end, this report has recommended that Bunbury develop and implement a reintegration services plan (Recommendation 13).

Appendix 1

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
1. Ensure adequate relief coverage for all staff teams.	<p>Supported – Existing Departmental Initiative</p> <p>The Department's focus on human resources is being strengthened with the introduction of a new human resources system focused on recruitment and training. A key project will be the development of workforce planning and management strategies to ensure that the Department has the right number of work-ready staff now, and in the future. This will be achieved with the establishment of workforce plans for prison officers.</p> <p>Action Required:</p> <p>Ensure the workforce plans for prison officers suitably address the needs of each facility.</p>
2. At all prisons and throughout the Department, implement processes to embed the values and goals of the new Strategic Plan, including its focus on respect, reintegration and substantive equality.	<p>Supported – Existing Departmental Initiative</p> <p>The Department of Corrective Services has commenced a functional review of the Department, with the intent of ensuring that directorates are aligned to the new vision, mission and values. It will ensure that directorates have the right structures to achieve strategic plan deliverables. A key focus includes embedding a culture of leadership and team work at all levels.</p> <p>The Department undertook extensive consultation in developing the values set out in the Strategic Plan. These are being embedded through the use of regular updates via the intranet, weekly Commissioner broadcasts, site visits by the Commissioner, information sessions and the participation of relevant staff in working groups and committees.</p> <p>Action Required:</p> <p>No additional action required.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>3. The Department should provide regular Senior Officer leadership and management training at all prisons.</p>	<p>Supported – Existing Departmental Initiative</p> <p>The Department has a focus on embedding a culture of leadership at all levels. A project under the Leadership and Culture strategic platform is the development of an effective workplace training and leadership package. The Department's Operational Support Division has implemented an Assistant Senior Officer Development Program, which now operates at all facilities. This program offers appropriate training that will support and enable prison officers to perform higher duties at the Senior Officer level. Local management has introduced a system where prison officers expressing a desire to perform higher duties are required to complete a Development Plan, which outlines the expectations of the role.</p> <p>Action Required: No further action required.</p>
<p>4. Bunbury Prison should implement Senior Officer team meetings.</p>	<p>Supported</p> <p>Bunbury Management is supportive of the establishment of regular formal Senior Officer team meetings. Previously these have been held on an informal basis.</p> <p>Action Required: No further action required.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>5. Provide dedicated staffing to support OS&H management at Bunbury.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>Maintaining a safe work environment is the responsibility of all employees. The Department is satisfied that the current staffing arrangements are sufficient to fulfil Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) obligations at all facilities.</p> <p>The provision of an OSH framework with an OSH committee ensures that standards are consistent across the custodial estate. It means a systematic approach is adopted where learnings can be exchanged and issues that emerge in one site can be addressed at other facilities. Such an approach affords both flexibility and consistent standards.</p> <p>The Department has dedicated staff located centrally to support OSH obligations across all sites. At Bunbury, workplace obligations for OSH are fulfilled by the Business Manager and supported by trained Safety and Health representatives.</p> <p>The Department also has a number of volunteer Safety and Health Representatives (SHRs), elected into SHR positions at all sites for a term of 2 years. SHRs are an important part of the Department's OSH Management System and are provided with work time to perform their role.</p> <p>In accordance with the Department's OSH Induction and Training Procedure there is a requirement for all employees to be provided with appropriate training, backed up by online refresher courses that shall be completed every three years.</p> <p>Action Required: No action required.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>6. Replace Unit 1 with appropriate, contemporary accommodation that meets the security, safety, and personal needs of the different groups of prisoners held there.</p>	<p>Supported in Principle</p> <p>Unit One is currently utilised as a short-term maximum security section. A number of issues affect decisions on investment in unit replacement including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • designated use of unit; • occupancy rates; • understanding and addressing the needs of specific offender cohorts; • refurbishment options; • the cost associated with the rebuild of a unit; and • infrastructure optimisation and value for money. <p>The Department is developing a strategic asset framework that takes into account current offender needs to inform current and future capital asset investment requirements. The Strategic Asset Plan is reviewed annually to assist with planning for the capital works process.</p> <p>Action Required: Ensure that refurbishment or replacement options for Unit One are considered in the annual review of the Strategic Asset Plan.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>7. Develop and implement improved processes for the current gatehouse, control room and sally port, to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of Bunbury's procedural security.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>Bunbury's procedural security within its gatehouse operations is adequate, supported by a range of appropriate policies, systems and procedures. These include the 'Policy for Gathering and Preservation of Evidence, Continuity of Exhibits' and the 'Procedures for the Preservation of Evidence, Continuity of Exhibits, Drug Movements and Inventory Control.' The procedures in the event that contraband is located are applied consistently across the site.</p> <p>The Department's new strategic plan has a focus on identifying and continually reviewing risks, which will see the development and implementation of a strategy for the safety and security of prisoners. Part of this strategy will include a review and consolidation of operational standards and rules, including associated processes.</p> <p>Action Required: No action required as procedures are already in place.</p>
<p>8. Undertake infrastructure improvements to the gatehouse, control room, sally port and security office to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of Bunbury's physical security.</p>	<p>Supported in Principle</p> <p>Bunbury is aware of the difficulties faced with the current design and layout of the gatehouse areas and has previously made changes to improve functionality. All maintenance and infrastructure improvements for facilities are consolidated and reviewed annually. These are then prioritised against several criteria including risk and offender management.</p> <p>Action Required: No additional action required as the Bunbury Gatehouse replacement is already documented in the Strategic Asset Plan.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>9. Increase the range and frequency of recreational options at Bunbury, including the provision of external activities for PRU prisoners and opportunities for prisoners to gain formal recreation qualifications.</p>	<p>Supported in Part</p> <p>The Department believes that the range and frequency of recreation options provided by Bunbury is adequate. Bunbury offers a range of structured activities, including bingo, low impact group exercise, tennis, pool, table tennis, darts and badminton. Equipment such as isometric equipment in Unit 2, a small gym in Unit 3, Wii-Fit placed within the houses (which OICS reports has received a poor uptake), and a sports oval are also provided.</p> <p>Additional recreational options will be considered in the context of the entire adult custodial estate.</p> <p>Action Required: Continue with providing the intended external activities for PRU prisoners.</p>
<p>10. Recruit an Aboriginal Health Worker for Bunbury Regional Prison.</p>	<p>Supported in Principle</p> <p>The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) since 2011 funded an Aboriginal re-entry worker position, at Bunbury. This funding was for a finite period with the additional position ceasing just prior to this inspection.</p> <p>The Department is currently reviewing service delivery options for Offender Health Services which will focus on need and value for money.</p> <p>Action Required: Ensure the review of Health Services considers the health needs of Aboriginal offenders and the most appropriate service delivery.</p>

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>11. Make legislative change or implement administrative arrangements to ensure that all life sentence and indeterminate sentence prisoners can apply to the Prisoners Review Board for inclusion in a re-socialisation or equivalent program.</p>	<p>Noted</p> <p>Bunbury currently holds four prisoners that were sentenced under the <i>Offenders Community Corrections Act 1963</i> (OCCA) prior to its repeal in 1995. Unlike other prisoners sentenced to life or indefinite imprisonment, these prisoners are not legally eligible for re-socialisation programs under the provisions of the <i>Sentence Administration Act 2003</i>.</p> <p>Whilst the Department supports the re-socialisation and rehabilitation of all prisoners, this matter falls within the portfolio responsibilities of the Department of the Attorney General, which include amendments to sentencing legislation.</p> <p>Hansard records show that the Attorney General has advised Parliament on 18 November 2014 that appropriate amendments to the <i>Sentence Administration Act 2003</i> are being considered although the complexity of the State's sentencing legislation means that amendments require careful consideration. Once a Bill is passed, participation in a re-socialisation program will be an option for prisoners serving a sentence imposed prior to the repeal of the OCCA. OCCA sentenced prisoners are not precluded from applying to the Prisoner Review Board for release. Prisoner Review Board data indicates that several prisoners sentenced under the OCCA legislation have been released on parole.</p> <p>The Department awaits the outcomes of amendments to the <i>Sentence Administration Act 2003</i>.</p> <p>Action Required:</p> <p>The recommendation is outside the control of the Department.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>12. Ensure that Vocational Support Officers focus on their core responsibilities by ceasing to deploy them into custodial roles.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>In accordance with section 36 of the <i>Prisons Act 1981</i>, the Superintendent is responsible for the good government, good order and security of that prison. At times it is necessary for the Superintendent to reassess core operational needs and daily priorities and to deploy staff as required.</p> <p>The coverage of all staff shortages is currently managed within Departmental guidelines and constraints. Workforce plans for prison officers will be prepared to ensure the right number of work-ready staff now and in the future.</p> <p>Action Required: No further action required.</p>
<p>13. Bunbury to develop and implement a reintegration services plan with targets and performance measures.</p>	<p>Supported – Existing Departmental Initiative</p> <p>Bunbury advised the inspection team that it was planning to develop a reintegration services plan by mapping prisoner population needs for medium security prisoners who lack the level of re-entry services and supports available to minimum security prisoners.</p> <p>The Department's Adult Justice Services Division has a renewed focus on integrated and individualised offender management, rehabilitation and reintegration and a reduction in offending. Review work will include an evaluation of individual and group based treatment programs, service delivery models and the business processes that support them.</p> <p>Action Required: No further action required.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>14. Bring the Bunbury Pre-Release Unit within the remit of the Assistant Commissioner Re-entry and Services.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>The Department does not support administrative separation of the Pre-Release Unit from the main custodial facility. The Department's focus on aligning structure with strategy and functional clarity means that re-entry services will be integrated with other rehabilitation and reintegration programs in order to promote offender through care and outreach services into the community.</p> <p>Action Required: No further action required.</p>
<p>15. Establish the Pre-Release Unit as a stand-alone facility with its own management, staffing, budget, and performance measures.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>As stated in the previous response, the Department does not support establishing the Pre-Release Unit as a stand-alone facility.</p> <p>Action Required: No action required.</p>
<p>16. For as long as the Pre-Release Unit remains an adjunct of the main Bunbury facility, staff it with a dedicated roster, achieved through expression of interest.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>The prison considered a revised staffing model for the PRU in 2014. Establishing a specific roster for dedicated staff to work at the PRU would limit workforce flexibility. Currently a unit based roster that takes account of security and offender management is in use.</p> <p>Action Required: No action required.</p>

THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 2015 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation	Acceptance Level/Response/Nominated Action
<p>17. Ensure that section 95 staffing levels are consistently sufficient for the number of prisoners eligible for external activities.</p>	<p>Not Supported</p> <p>The muster of the Pre Release Unit has declined from 108 to 72 in April 2014, with 16 prisoners currently engaged in two section 95 programs. The Department is satisfied that the current staff to offender ratio is sufficient to support and maintain an appropriate range of external programs that will assist prisoners to reintegrate with the community on release.</p> <p>The remaining 56 prisoners are fully employed in a range of internal and external activities that supports the re-entry philosophy and operations of Bunbury and the Pre-Release Unit.</p> <p>Action Required: No action required.</p>

Appendix 2

SCORECARD ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE 2011 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No.	Recommendations By Type of Recommendation/Duration Report No. 75, <i>Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison.</i>	Assessment of the Department's Implementations				
		Poor	Less than acceptable	Acceptable	More than acceptable	Excellent
1.	The Department ensures that Bunbury Regional Prison has a permanent management team holding substantive positions.				•	
2.	That the Department establishes the causes underlying the high number of workers' compensation claims at Bunbury Regional Prison and addresses these.		•			
3.	Upgrade the sally port, gatehouse and reception area at Bunbury Regional Prison to allow for more efficient and secure entry processes for staff, prisoners and visitors.		•			
4.	Increase the number and diversity of emergency management exercises held each year at Bunbury Regional Prison to better prepare officers to deal with emergency situations.			•		
5.	The Department improve process and information sharing between Justice Intelligence Services and prison sites.			•		
6.	The Bunbury Regional Prison leadership team reinvigorate and reinforce an ethos of prisoner management that emphasises high levels of engagement with prisoners to enhance the safety of prisoners and staff and to restore the excellent levels of interaction found in past inspections of the prison.				•	
7.	Bunbury Regional Prison management evaluate the functioning of the 'I want parade' to ensure it is still meeting the needs of prisoners and staff to address prisoner needs, and modify practices based on the outcome of this evaluation.			•		

SCORECARD ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE
2011 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No.	Recommendations By Type of Recommendation/Duration Report No. 75, <i>Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison.</i>	Assessment of the Department's Implementations				
		Poor	Less than acceptable	Acceptable	More than acceptable	Excellent
8.	The Department meet its obligation to provide legal resources to prisoners throughout the state, including those accommodated at Bunbury Regional Prison, by establishing system-wide access to all relevant materials and by maintaining and updating these materials.			•		
9.	Evaluate the new reception intake assessment process to ensure it is appropriately useful and valuable to prisoners and staff.			•		
10.	Maintain prisoner numbers at Bunbury Regional Prison at a level which allows for a proper hierarchical model of prisoner management to be reinstated.		•			
11.	Reinvigorate the peer support system at Bunbury Regional Prison. In addition to the peer support team, consider introducing a prisoner forum (akin to those operating at Acacia and Albany Prisons) as an alternative mechanism for prisoners to raise concerns with management.				•	
12.	Increase recreation opportunities to reflect the needs of the population, including more passive options for older prisoners and community integrated sports for minimum-security prisoners who do not have access to an oval.		•			
13.	Replicating the system in the PRU, provide a life skills officer to support, educate and mentor prisoners in the self-care unit in the main prison (Unit 3).			•		
14.	Recruit an Aboriginal Health Worker for Bunbury Regional Prison.		•			

SCORECARD ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE
2011 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No.	Recommendations By Type of Recommendation/Duration Report No. 75, Report of an Announced Inspection of Bunbury Regional Prison.	Assessment of the Department's Implementations				
		Poor	Less than acceptable	Acceptable	More than acceptable	Excellent
15.	Ensure that prisoners employed to clean health centres at Bunbury Regional Prison and other prisons are suitably trained to carry out such specialist cleaning services.			•		
16.	Review and revise assessment and care planning tools to ensure that they are culturally appropriate and facilitate more comprehensive identification of and support for health issues.		•			
17.	Review and revise pharmacy services and medication administration processes to better provide for prisoners' evidenced needs. Outcomes should include 24-hour pharmacy coverage; flexibility in prescribing, dispensing and administration processes; and compliance with prescribing guidelines.		•			
18.	The Department should prioritise the development of an integrated case management philosophy and operational model that includes all prisoners.			•		
19.	Re-open Unit 5.		•			
20.	Develop a specific roster for the PRU with dedicated PRU officers and provide appropriate training in the role and operations of a pre-release facility to all officers who will work in the PRU.		•			
21.	Remove the cap on gratuity levels and allow each prison administration team the flexibility to manage gratuity levels locally, in accordance with the prison's own industry plan.			•		

Appendix 3

THE INSPECTION TEAM

Neil Morgan	Inspector of Custodial Services
Lauren Netto	Principal Research and Inspections Officer
Matt Merefield	Inspections and Research Officer
Jim Bryden	Inspections and Research Officer
Charlie Staples	Inspections and Research Officer
Cliff Holdom	Inspections and Research Officer
Joseph Wallam	Community Liaison Officer

Appendix 4

KEY DATES

Formal notification of announced inspection	30 June 2014
Pre-inspection community consultation	13 October 2014
Start of on-site phase	2 November 2014
Completion of on-site phase	7 November 2014
Inspection exit debrief	7 November 2014
Draft Report sent to the Department of Corrective Services	17 April 2015
Draft report returned by the Department of Corrective Services	18 May 2015
Declaration of Prepared Report	8 June 2015

*Inspection of prisons, court custody centres, prescribed lock-ups,
juvenile detention centres and review of custodial services in Western Australia.*



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